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I.  PREFACE* 
 
In the 1970s, states began to experiment with what was called the 
central panel system of administrative adjudication – an approach 
first utilized in California in 1945. In this new model, administrative 
law judges (ALJs) would not be employed by the agencies whose 
cases they hear, but by a distinct central panel agency created solely 
to manage them. 
The central panel system is a framework to increase the 
judicialization of the state administrative process by seeking to keep 
ALJs separate from the agencies they serve, and to thereby ensure 
fair, high-caliber decision-making within an environment that 
promotes cost efficiencies. 
Much of the discussion historically has been about the problems 
each central panel agency had faced in being created, and the even 
bigger challenges in getting the funding necessary for the present and 
for the expansion that each wanted. Every central panel is different, 
shaped either by the legislative battles that led to its creation, or the 
debates that led to the Executive Order creating the central panel. 
These differences involve how these central panels operated, 
including the kinds of cases they heard, how the agency was funded, 
                                                          
Ѱ Originally published on the Chicago Appleseed Fund for Justice website in 
February 2019. See MALCOLM C. RICH & ALISON C. GOLDSTEIN, CHICAGO 
APPLESEED FUND FOR JUSTICE & CHICAGO COUNCIL OF LAWYERS, The Need for a 
Central Panel Approach to Administrative Adjudication: Pros, Cons, and Selected 
Practices (Feb. 2019), http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/Central-Panel-Report-2.17.pdf. Reprinted with the 
permission of principal authors Malcolm C. Rich and Alison C. Goldstein. 
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how decision-making independence was insured, and whether there 
are cost efficiencies.  
Legislative battles to create the central panel agencies often led to 
selected agencies being exempted in order to avoid a potentially 
deadly political battle. Sometimes agencies provided the opposition; 
sometimes unions provided the opposition; sometimes differing 
viewpoints between the executive and legislative branches led to a 
particular compromise. But a consistent tension was always whether 
an ALJ should be a specialist or a generalist. And always lurking in 
the background was the question of whether an ALJ should have 
final decision-making authority.  
In 1981, there were seven central panel agencies. On May 8, 
1981, a workshop was held in Chicago to provide a forum for 
exchange of information about state and federal ALJs and researchers 
doing work in the administrative law area. The event was co-
sponsored by the American Judicature Society and the 
Administrative Conference of the U.S. - and became a forum for the 
candid discussion of similarities and differences between the state 
and federal adjudicative system and a consideration of the strengths 
and weaknesses of central panel systems.  
The November 1981 issue of Judicature was devoted to the 
administrative law process. The articles, written by both researchers 
and practitioners, provided an overview of the central panel approach 
and how they operated. In 1983, a monograph was produced utilizing 
new research and the outcomes from the 1981 workshop (The 
Central Panel System for Administrative Law Judges: A Survey of 
Seven States, by Malcolm C. Rich and Wayne E. Brucar).  
Over the next thirty years, there was substantial growth in the 
central panel approach with more than thirty state and municipalities 
adopting the central panel system. In September 2014, I was 
contacted by Judge Larry Craddock who asked me to assist in doing a 
new research study of the central panel system with an emphasis on 
what had changed to lead to the movement’s growth, how central 
panels were currently operating, and what were the pros and cons of 
the approach thirty years after the initial study. Judge Craddock, who 
recently passed away, was a tireless advocate who promoted social 
justice generally, and the quality and independence of administrative 
adjudication, in particular. He had come to believe that the central 
panel approach was a key to reaching these goals and wanted to 
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promote research around the central panel efforts. I agreed to lead the 
research effort.  
The purpose of this report is to provide a picture of the current 
state of the central panel system, now that the panels have had 
decades to operate. This picture includes the structure of the panels 
and the pros and cons of central panels. It includes insights into the 
central panel approach, including fairness and due process, 
efficiency, cost reduction, hiring, training, and supervision. We also 
focus on one of the most controversial of the issues surrounding 
central panels—the independence of ALJs, including final decision-
making authority. We present our survey results which provide a 
description of the central panel phenomenon and conclude with 
suggested best practices.  
The authors, in doing this study, have met many persons who 
have dedicated their professional lives to leading and studying 
government systems that promise fair, efficient, and high-quality 
adjudication. In addition to the Judge Craddock, we wish to thank 
Judge Julian Mann, Judge Robert Cohen, and Judge Lorraine Lee for 
their guidance. We thank Roger Lewis, Emily Gilman, and Kristen 
Jones for their research and guidance. We also thank Lakeisha 
Andress and Vinita Singh for their research assistance. 
 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The central panel movement has over the last 50 years changed 
the landscape of administrative adjudication—changing the way 
administrative law judges (ALJs) are utilized, including the finality 
of their decisions, the uniformity of hearing procedures, and the 
perceived fairness of the administrative process. 
The central panel approach was created to bring a new level of 
due process to state-based administrative adjudication. Hearings 
within the central panel were designed to be cost efficient, uniform, 
high quality, and fair to all parties. Over time, the goals of central 
panels have expanded to include providing an effective, due process-
oriented environment for the increasing number of persons seeking 
justice without the benefit of legal counsel. 
The goal of this report is to document the growth of the central 
panel movement that has now emerged in a majority of states. This 
research is designed to provide data-informed recommendations to 
states and municipalities considering the adoption of a central panel 
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system or the enlargement of the jurisdiction encompassed by an 
existing central panel as well as to states considering the adoption of 
a more final decision-making authority for their central panel ALJs. 
The work is also intended to inform the debate over whether the 
central panel approach is something that the federal government 
should consider. 
This research looks at such issues as the cost efficiency of central 
panels as well as the effect that central panels have on fairness. We 
also look at what characteristics are most likely to increase efficiency 
while maintaining the benefits of expertise and specialization, 
including finality of decision-making, whether jurisdiction is 
mandatory or optional, and how judges are assigned to cases.  
 
III.  A HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL PANEL APPROACH TO 
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION 
 
The debate about the function and independence of ALJs is as old 
as administrative law itself. Creating executive branch agencies with 
adjudicative powers became a major part of American jurisprudence 
in the New Deal era. But Roscoe Pound, the former dean of the 
Harvard Law School, was concerned about the built-in conflicts 
within administrative law as early as 1907, when he complained 
about state and federal courts upholding constitutional statutes in 
more than 50 cases that allowed executive agencies to have 
administrative hearing officers.1  
Pound quoted the French philosopher Montesquieu: “there is no 
liberty if the power of judging is not separate from the legislative 
power and from the executive power.”2 But despite Dean Pound’s 
entreaties, the growth of administrative agencies with an adjudicative 
component was abundant. The central panel approach was designed 
to make the adjudication component independent from agency 
functions while focusing on the fairness, quality, and effectiveness of 
the adjudication. 
In 1978, amendments to the federal Administrative Procedure Act 
changed the term “hearing officer” into “administrative law judge”—
                                                          
1 Roscoe Pound, Executive Justice, 55 U. PA. L. REV. 137 (1957). 
2 Id. 
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which demonstrated the growth in popularity, independence, and 
prestige afforded to administrative adjudication. 
ALJs have become an important part of the American justice 
system. The life of nearly everyone is affected in some way by 
decisions rendered by these “quasi-judicial” judges, yet the 
administrative system of justice still does not receive the attention 
that it deserves. State court judges are evaluated for retention 
purposes by the voluntary bar associations, and court watching is a 
common approach toward accountability in the state courts. State 
ALJs, however, are in many ways the “hidden judiciary,” making 
decisions often as important or even more important than those 
rendered by our state judges. 
The central panel is a framework that increases the judicialization 
of the state administrative law process by seeking to keep ALJs 
separate from the agencies they serve and to provide a hearing 
process that is uniform, efficient, and accountable. In so doing, the 
central panel approach seeks to ensure fair, high-caliber decision-
making. 
Starting more than fifty years ago, questions were raised about 
the decision- making independence of ALJs who were employees of 
the agencies comprising administrative justice. Were these ALJs to 
be fact-finders for their employer agencies or were they independent 
arbiters? Other questions were raised about the cost inefficiencies of 
having each administrative agency house its own group of ALJs. 
The administrative process was originally designed to serve as an 
alternative to court action in complex economic and scientific 
matters. It has expanded to a panoply of matters, from the most 
complex – to social welfare, fact-driven matters where the litigants 
are often pro se. The executive branch agencies have been the subject 
of criticism over whether they adequately protect the rights of 
litigants and whether they are employing policy fairly. 
Administrative law judges, as employees of these administrative 
agencies, have been included as part of this criticism. 
The federal approach to these criticisms is to allow the ALJ to 
remain an employee of a particular agency but to provide career 
appointment (tenure until retirement) and to give responsibility for 
the compensation and discipline of ALJs to bodies separate from the 
agencies. On the state level, the central panel phenomenon is a 
different reaction to these criticisms – removing ALJs from particular 
agencies and placing them within an independent central panel 
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agency. It is an experiment in administrative adjudication; indeed, it 
is a state-based laboratory experimenting with an approach to better 
ensure a high-quality, effective, efficient, and independent 
administrative judiciary. 
 
IV.  PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Chicago Appleseed worked on its current central panel research 
with an advisory panel of administrative law judges led by Judge 
Larry Craddock as well as social scientists, pro bono lawyers, law 
students, and graduate students in the social sciences. We have 
collected data necessary to draw conclusions about how central 
panels have evolved over time and what benefits they might offer 
over a more traditional administrative law system. Our research has 
included: 
 
  A survey designed for Central Panel Directors, 
Administrative Law Judges/Hearing Officers, Agency 
Directors, and practitioners.  
  Interviews with Central Panel Directors, ALJs, Agency 
Directors, and practitioners. In these interviews, we 
learned about what prompted the state to create the central 
panel, stakeholders’ satisfaction with the central panel, 
and challenges that arise both in the transition to a central 
panel as well as with maintaining a central panel over 
time.  
  Interviews with experts and practitioners regarding the role 
of central panel agencies within administrative 
adjudication—the importance and impact of decision-
making independence on lower-income persons and 
economic efficiencies and effectiveness that affect 
businesses and individuals. These interviewees included: 
professors specializing in research around administrative 
law; practitioners within legal aid and public interest 
organizations who represent persons before administrative 
tribunals; administrative agency personnel speaking to the 
impact that a central panel is having or could have on 
their operations; researchers who have been focusing on 
independence, efficiency, and effectiveness of 
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administrative adjudication; and persons who have 
appeared before administrative hearing officers within the 
administrative law system.  
 
We consider the central panel approach a state-based laboratory 
for making administrative adjudication fairer and more effective. 
This report covers the following topics: 
 
  History of the Central Panel Approach 
  Implementing the Central Panel and the Reasons for the 
Growth of this Approach 
  Structure of Central Panels 
  Role of the ALJ within the Central Panel 
  Pros and Cons of a Central Panel System 
  Insights into the Central Panel Approach: Fairness, 
Efficiency, Cost Reduction, Hiring, Training, Supervision, 
and the Issue of Generalist v. Specialist ALJs 
  Independence of Administrative Law Judges, including 
final decision-making authority 
  Addressing Agency Concern with the Central Panel System 
  Growth in the Central Panel Movement 
  Survey Results: A Description of the Central Panels 
  Suggested Practices of Central Panels and Central Panel 
ALJs 
 
V.  THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF THE CENTRAL PANEL 
 
In the 1970s, states began to experiment with what was called the 
central panel system of administrative adjudication—an approach 
first utilized in California in 1945. In this new system, rather than 
being employed by the agencies whose cases they hear, ALJs would 
be employed by a distinct central panel agency created solely to 
manage them. 
The central panel system is a framework to increase the 
judicialization of the state administrative process by seeking to keep 
ALJs separate from the agencies they serve and to thereby ensure 
fair, high-caliber decision-making within an environment that 
promotes cost efficiencies. 
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Historically, much of the discussion has been about the problems 
each central panel agency faced in its creation and the even-bigger 
challenges in getting the funding necessary for the present as well as 
for the future expansion that each wanted. Every central panel is 
different, shaped by the legislative battles that led to its creation. 
These differences involve how these central panels operate, including 
the kinds of cases they hear, how the agency is funded, how decision- 
making independence is ensured, and whether there are cost 
efficiencies. 
Legislative battles to create the central panel agencies often led to 
selected agencies being exempted in order to avoid a potentially 
deadly political battle. Sometimes agencies provided the opposition; 
sometimes unions provided the opposition; sometimes differing 
viewpoints between the executive and legislative branches led to a 
particular compromise. But a consistent tension was always whether 
an ALJ should be a specialist or a generalist. And always lurking in 
the background was whether an ALJ should have final decision-
making authority. 
We believe that administrative hearing officers are the hidden 
judiciary, and administrative adjudication deserves the attention of 
reform-minded practitioners who demand decision-making 
independence, efficiency, and effectiveness from our justice system. 
We say “hidden judiciary” because – while so much attention is paid 
to the selection or election and evaluation of state court judges – 
relatively little attention is paid to the administrative judiciary, who 
often are handling cases just as complex and as important to society. 
The central panel approach – the independent central panel 
administrative agency that houses administrative hearing officers –
represents an innovation its proponents say improve the 
administration of justice. Its opponents, however, say it is a step 
toward reducing the discretion of administrative agencies and, thus, 
toward reducing the effectiveness of the administrative process. 
 
VI. RESEARCH ON THE EMERGING TREND: THE CENTRAL PANEL 
 
California was the first state to create a central panel in 1945, but 
it was not until the 1970s that the concept began to expand. In 1980, 
the American Judicature Society (AJS) noted the central panel as an 
emerging trend in administrative adjudication and began to research 
the phenomenon. 
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In May 1981, the seven directors of the central panel agencies 
convened in Chicago for a first-ever meeting to discuss issues facing 
central panels at the time. The meeting was co-sponsored by AJS and 
the Administrative Conference of the U.S. The agenda was similar to 
the issues facing central panels today. The panels were just beginning 
to grow in jurisdiction, but agency pushback was a major subject of 
discussion. Other topics of concern were how the central panels were 
to be funded, technology, hiring and supervising procedures, quality 
control, and whether central panel ALJs were to be specialists 
(hearing one of a very few type of cases) or generalists (hearing a 
variety of cases). Final decision authority was also on the agenda, 
with an underlying theme of whether central panel ALJs were to be 
more akin to Article III judges or remain extensions of the executive 
agencies. 
Based on the discussions over the two-day convening and a 
written survey of those directors, AJS published a monograph 
describing the operations of those seven central panels.3 In addition 
to demographic information, the monograph looked at the pros and 
cons of central panels as reported at the time. 
Since 1981, there has been phenomenal growth in the number and 
size of central panels. While there were only seven states with central 
panels in 1981, by 2000 there were more than twenty central panels 
at the state and municipal levels. Today there are more than thirty 
states and municipalities that have moved to a central panel system of 
administrative law judges. The number of judges and the amount of 
funding for central panels has likewise increased substantially. In 
1981, there were 160 central panel ALJs. In 2016, there were 787. 
The total budget for state central panel agencies in 1981 was $10 
million. In 2016, it was $257 million.4 
 
VII. IMPLEMENTING THE CENTRAL PANEL AND THE REASONS FOR ITS 
GROWTH 
 
                                                          
3 Rich & Brucar, The Central Panel System of Administrative Law Judges: A 
Survey of Seven States (1983). 
4 Id. More recent descriptive data can be found in the survey of central panels 
conducted by the Louisiana Division of Administrative Law. This central panel 
agency issues on an annual basis demographic information on state-based central 
panels. 
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The central panel movement involves an interactive web of 
legislative negotiations, state-based politics, improving customer 
service, the policies and procedures of the hearing system, due 
process considerations, and perceived fairness. The central panel 
seeks to balance due process concerns with administrative 
effectiveness while retaining ALJ independence. 
Central panels are formed in a number of ways and vary from 
state to state. Typically, the governor, with the consent of the state 
senate, appoints a chief ALJ or director to head the central panel.5 
However, in other states, the chief ALJ or director may be appointed 
by a wide array of other means. For example, in North Carolina, the 
Chief Justice appoints the Chief ALJ, the Secretary of State appoints 
the position in Tennessee, and in Wisconsin the chief ALJ is hired 
through the civil service system.6 
Most central panels are created through legislative action, 
although Michigan and now Illinois are two states where the central 
panels were created through executive order. 
In 2016, Governor Bruce Rauner of Illinois established a pilot 
central panel in Illinois.7 With a second executive order issued in 
2017, the Illinois pilot is now a permanent part of the administrative 
landscape in Illinois.8 
In its first year, the Illinois central panel focused on things that 
many of the other central panels have been working on—building a 
high-quality infrastructure including elements such as uniformity of 
hearing procedures and technology for hearing-data management. 
In 2018, legislation was introduced to expand the jurisdiction of 
the Illinois central panel with defined exceptions, including workers’ 
compensation cases—a popular exception among central panels. The 
legislation failed to leave the legislative committee. 
 
A. History of the Central Panel Movement 
 
                                                          
5 Allen C. Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 
1990s, J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 117 (1994). 
6 Interviews with central panel directors. 
7 Executive Order 2016-06. Executive Order to Eliminate Backlog and Delay 
in State Administrative Hearings. 
8 Executive Order 2017-04. Executive Order to Continue and Expand 
Successes in Improving State Administrative Proceedings. 
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The central panel systems are invariably implemented within an 
existing structure of administrative adjudication. But the act of 
implementing the systems has often spurred conflicts that at times 
threatened the very existence of these panels. The changes that result 
from the creation of a central panel have an ongoing impact on the 
interests, values, and established practices of ALJs and agency 
personnel. 
With the exceptions of Michigan and Illinois, panels are created 
through the actions of state legislatures, which establish the broad 
duties and limits of the central panel in each state. The oldest central 
panel in existence can be found in California. Begun in the mid-
1940s, the debate surrounding it occurred at about the same time that 
arguments were being made in relation to the federal administrative 
procedure act. California’s system ultimately became a model for 
central panels established much later. 
In the 1930s, the State Bar of California established study 
committees to make recommendations to the legislature on 
approaches to administrative reform. In 1938 the bar issued a report 
seeking separation of the prosecuting and adjudication functions in 
state agencies and a procedure for judicial review of administrative 
decisions. The Judicial Council of California was directed by the 
legislature in 1941 to undertake studies of judicial review of 
administrative decisions and the need for changes in the procedures 
of regulatory agencies. The proposals were limited to the field of 
licensing, for the Judicial Council felt it was the area of 
administrative practice most in need of change.9 
The studies produced three proposals that were ultimately 
embodied in the California Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 
1946. The studies proposed that a new department of administrative 
procedure be created to devote “continuous and expert” attention to 
the operation and procedure of the state’s administrative agencies.10 
The department was also to furnish a home for a central panel of 
ALJs. 
                                                          
9 Clarkson, The History of the California Administrative Procedure Act, 15 
HASTINGS L.J. 137 (1964). 
10 Id. For a further discussion of the California system, see Abrams, 
Administrative Law judge Systems: The California View, 29 ADMIN. L. REV. 487 
(1977). 
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Following the enactment of a central panel system in California, 
other states began to enact a state administrative procedure act. 
Tennessee and Massachusetts each established a centralized system 
in 1974. The Tennessee central panel agency—the administrative 
procedures division—was not established as a central panel. It was 
created to hold hearings for the small boards and commissions under 
public health and insurance.11 
Later, the Tennessee APA was amended to state that agencies 
that are not authorized to have their own hearing officers were 
required to use the central panel, and other agencies could elect to 
use central panel hearing officers. Opposition emerged from agencies 
that were resistant to change. Each agency had its own way of doing 
things and they were not happy being required to change.12 
Central panels are often part of sweeping reforms in state 
administrative procedure. An example is the Florida division of 
administrative hearings, which began operations in November 1974. 
It came about as part of a broad administrative reform effort during 
which Florida substituted a new administrative procedure act. The 
thrust of the change involved rulemaking as opposed to hearings. At 
the heart of the creation of the Florida central panel was concern over 
agencies’ use of rulemaking to accomplish what they could not do by 
statute. The appearance of justice was a critical factor in convincing 
the legislature to include a central panel system within the Florida 
APA.13 
Fiscal matters were of prime importance to the Colorado central 
panel, created in the autumn of 1976. The catalyst for the creation of 
that panel reportedly was the Attorney General’s Office, which 
wished to promote decision-making independence and cost cutting. 
Largely because proponents made arguments selling the panel on its 
fiscal impact, the legislation slipped through “without anybody 
noticing,” said one respondent.14 
Changing ALJ roles and the politics surrounding the 
implementation of central panels spawned a competition among 
special interests in the various states. Some agency officials saw in 
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the legislative debates an attempt to replace their administrative 
authority with the inflexible rule of law. Proponents of the legislation 
saw the central panel approach as a way to improve the 
administration of justice as well as to enhance the job status of ALJs. 
Agency personnel saw the same legislation as an attempt both to 
reduce the effectiveness of the process and to restrict the agency’s 
ability to take action toward solving social problems. But those who 
worked to pass the legislation creating these early central panels 
often point to displeasure among some legislatures with agency 
rulemaking by fiat, which the central panel was designed to 
confront.15 
While the legislatures often focused on fiscal matters and 
agencies focused on their perceived loss of power, the debate 
surrounding the creation of these early central panels often involved 
ALJs who were very pleased to become part of the central panel. The 
main attractions included an increased variety of cases, 
independence, and often somewhat-higher pay than they had been 
receiving as non-central panel ALJs. But even among the ALJs, the 
change to hearing a variety of cases created for some of them a 
substantial modification of work behavior that sometimes resulted in 
job dissatisfaction.16 
A related problem in creating these early central panels involved 
the inherent structure of the central panel system. At the outset, ALJs 
who had been assigned to agencies were transferred into the central 
panels and then sometimes assigned to hear cases for their former 
agencies as independent ALJs. Disputes with former agencies at 
times spilled into the role of the central panel ALJ. Sometimes there 
would be animosity between ALJs and their former agencies, which 
appeared in what one observer described as cheap shots being taken 
by ALJs—pointed comments directed against agency officials within 
ALJ decisions. 
 
B. The Role of the Bar Associations in Creating the Early Central 
Panels 
 
                                                          
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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The State Bar associations were often important factors in many 
of the debates—not only in the creation of the early central panels. 
Their role in the creation of central panels has continued. The bar 
groups saw the central panel as a way of establishing enhanced 
prestige for lawyers, a goal which was seen as important to an 
association representing the interests of lawyers. But also at the heart 
of the support by state bars was the goal of creating an independent 
agency staffed by professionals with the sole function of conducting 
administrative hearings. 
 
VIII. THE STRUCTURE OF CENTRAL PANELS 
 
At the outset, the scope of central panel operations was dictated 
by the state legislatures through the state administrative procedure 
acts. In general, a jurisdiction can be considered as mandatory 
(agencies listed in the state APA must use central panel ALJs) or 
voluntary (agencies may use the central panel services).17 Central 
panels using a hybrid jurisdiction provide that the agencies can either 
use their own hearing officers or those in the centralized panel. 
Today, it is common for state legislation to delineate which 
agencies do not have to utilize central panel ALJs. Proponents of the 
mandatory system claim that ALJs will be independent of agency 
influence only if agencies must utilize central panel ALJs for all of 
their adjudications. An agency that can use its own hearing officers 
will be free to consciously divide its hearing load between the two 
types of ALJs. This, say the proponents of mandatory jurisdiction, 
will destroy the appearance of justice that the central panel program 
seeks. But advocates of voluntary jurisdiction argue that because 
agency officials will feel less threatened by a voluntary use of central 
panel ALJs, there would be fewer problems in implementing the 
central panel.18 
 
A. The Role of the Administrative Law Judge within the Central 
Panel 
 
                                                          
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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Related to the notion of ALJ independence is the amount of 
expertise that an ALJ should bring to the hearing process. This was 
the debate throughout the 1970s as the early central panels were 
being created. Those who see little need for expertise believe that 
ALJs have the ability to learn more than one area of the law and can 
serve as generalists—administrative judges who are capable of 
hearing a variety of types of cases. Critics subscribe to the view that 
administrative judges are present and useful only because of their 
specialized expertise in one area and, therefore, should only hear one 
type of case. 
Yet if the system assigns ALJs exclusively to one agency because 
of the need for specialized expertise, will there be a risk of bias 
among its ALJs that the central panel was devised to eliminate? 
Others argue that the lack of specialized ALJ expertise leads to 
inefficiency. These opponents also argue that ALJs without specific 
knowledge will have to be educated by the parties and will 
consequently be subject to manipulation.19 But acquiring information 
from the parties has always been part of judging. 
Today, the generalist-versus-specialist debate is resolved on a 
state-by-state, panel-by-panel basis. Judges sometimes hear only one 
type of case while others are assigned a variety of cases. In surveys 
conducted in the 1980s and interviews conducted since 2016, the 
results are similar. That is, central panels have developed hybrid 
systems through which some ALJs maintain specialized expertise in 
a very limited number of cases while other ALJs within the central 
panel are more generalist in nature. What seems to be consistent 
among ALJs we have surveyed and interviewed is that they tend to 
be satisfied with their jobs in no small part because of the opportunity 
to judge different areas of the law. 
 
IX. PROS AND CONS OF A CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM 
 
Since 2016, we have surveyed and interviewed central panel 
directors and ALJs across the country. We have also interviewed 
practitioners and agency personnel nationwide. In reporting the 
results of these surveys and interviews, we seek to compare our 
current results with those data collected in 1981 and 1982. The 
                                                          
19 Id. 
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following are the comparative results. In a subsequent section, we 
report the results of an electronic survey completed by twenty-three 
central panel directors. 
As we have discussed, debate over the pros and cons of a central 
panel system began in California in 1945 and intensified during the 
1970s and 1980s when there was substantial growth in the number of 
central panels. The following pros and cons related to central panels 
were part of the research we conducted both in the 1980s and during 
the current effort. 
 
  Proponents say that independent funding of central panels 
promotes ALJ independence. 
  Proponents of central panels claim that the central panel’s 
more- efficient allocation of ALJs reduces costs. Larger 
agencies will not have to keep all the ALJs they need to 
handle peak periods; smaller agencies will always have 
ALJs available to them. 
  Implementing a central panel transfers some degree of 
financial control from the agency to the panel. No longer 
do the agencies have exclusive administrative and 
financial control of the hearing process and, as a result, 
the system is a potential source of conflict. These 
concerns become evident during the changeover as well as 
during the preceding legislative debates. 
  Existing operations are funded in one of two ways. One 
approach is known as general funding. The state 
legislature appropriates a set amount of money which it 
transfers to the central panel agency to use as an operating 
budget. The other approach is the revolving fund, in 
which the central panel bills agencies for the use of its 
hearing services on an hourly basis. Under revolving 
funding, the agencies are appropriated funds by the state 
legislature. Central panels utilize both methods of 
funding, but their leaders are consistent in their 
conclusion that general funding is the best way to ensure 
the independence of central panel ALJ decision-making. 
  Proponents say the central panel will allow cost cutting 
through administrative efficiencies and encourage 
administrative cost-cutting innovations. By using the 
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adjudication services of the central panel, administrative 
agencies with a small number of ALJs will be able to 
eliminate administrative overhead costs by transferring 
their hearing function to the central panel. 
 
In cases where ALJs issue final rather than recommended 
decisions, cost savings will accrue from agency staff and 
litigants not having to conduct and participate in a second-
stage adjudication proceeding. 
  Proponents say central panel ALJs can hear a variety of 
cases so that they will always be approaching a problem 
from a fresh perspective. 
  Proponents say the central panel will encourage uniform 
policies and procedures and will allow for more efficient 
collection and analysis of hearing data. 
  Proponents see the judicialization of ALJs to be a good 
thing, but opponents of the central panel approach see it 
as a step toward reducing the power of agencies, making 
the system unnecessarily inefficient. 
  Opponents say that placing all decisions relating to ALJ 
employment in the hands of agencies risks creating the 
appearance of bias. They point to the sometimes-political 
appointment of central panel directors as a source of 
political intervention into the administrative adjudication 
process. 
 
The directors of central panels are often appointed 
through the state political structure. Once appointed, 
directors are given administrative control over the 
operations. To ensure independence, however, the term of 
office is often not in direct overlap with the term of the 
then-governor, and we heard no instance where governors 
have sought to influence the decision-making of the 
central panels. 
 
ALJs are most often protected by the civil service system, 
while their director can be removed at will by the 
executive. This has raised the issue of whether central 
panel directors who are selected by elected officials may 
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appear susceptible to influence from the official who 
nominated them. 
 
Directors always downplay this possibility and note 
that they consider their positions to be apolitical. 
Some note that their position has a benefit in terms of 
their ability to work with members of the legislature to 
bring about a more efficient and just policy for the central 
panel. A director familiar with and accepted by the 
political system, they say, can better resist attempts by a 
governor, for example, to interfere with the administrative 
process. These directors see their role as a buffer between 
state government and the decision-making independence 
of ALJs.20 
  Proponents of central panel systems note that central panels 
have low filing fees and, in many cases, no filing fees at 
all. 
  Proponents of central panel systems note the new types of 
cases now being heard in some central panels that 
formerly were in the province of the state court judiciary, 
including corrections and child support. In general, these 
proponents note the accountability of central panel ALJs. 
State court judges are evaluated rarely—often just as part 
of a re-election bid, and then only for educating voters on 
a YES or NO basis. Central panel directors report that 
their ALJs are evaluated annually with a focus on how to 
improve judicial performance. 
  Proponents also note that while the administrative process 
has important implications for the business community, it 
has an increasingly important role in matters involving the 
welfare safety net: cases involving food stamp eligibility 
determinations, Medicaid eligibility, eligibility for state-
funded home health services, matters involving long-term 
care facilities certification, child support matters, hearings 
involving child and family state services, etc. 
 
                                                          
20 Id. 
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Some legal aid lawyers have expressed the hope that 
independent, well-trained ALJs will provide more 
objective, higher-quality adjudication to their low-income 
clients. Equally as important, some lawyers have 
expressed their view that highly trained, independent 
ALJs will be of benefit to pro se litigants by providing a 
less adversarial, more efficient system of adjudication 
designed to make proceedings more fair, effective, and 
efficient for those without legal representation. 
 
X. INSIGHTS INTO THE CENTRAL PANEL APPROACH 
 
A. Fairness and Due Process 
 
Proponents of central panel systems contend that separating the 
adjudication process from the agencies that have an interest in the 
outcome of a case enhances fairness and minimizes the appearance of 
impropriety and bias. Directors we interviewed often commented that 
the central panel system enhances public confidence in the system 
because ALJs are independent of the agencies.21 
In interviews we conducted with legal aid lawyers whose clients 
appear before the “safety net” agencies, we have heard that they and 
their clients are often subject to a system that is “stacked against 
them.” Some see an independent ALJ as the safety valve for 
fairness.22 
Illinois Administrative Law Judge Edward Schoenbaum, a leader 
of the central panel movement, stated, “many people believe that 
[ALJs] who are not in a central hearing agency are biased in their 
adjudicative responsibilities ... [because the] ALJs are hired, 
                                                          
21 Based on interviews with Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative Hearing 
System, Executive Director), Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of Administrative 
Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality Assurance), Allen 
C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of Administrative Hearings, Former Director), 
Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative 
Law Judge), Cynthia Eyre (Louisiana Division of Administrative LALJ, former 
General Counsel). However, most conclusions about the fairness of central panel 
systems are derived from anecdotal, interview-based evidence, and the results of 
litigant surveys conducted by many central panels. 
22 Interviews with individual legal aid lawyers. 
   
Fall 2019    The Need for a Central Panel Approach 21 
promoted, supervised, and paid by the very agency for whom [they] 
are [reviewing]... [t]he public thinks this is unfair.”23 
Further, Ann Wise, former Director of the Louisiana Division of 
Administrative Law, holds fairness as one of the greatest 
justifications for implementing a central panel system, stating, “it is 
not fair to combine into one person or political entity all of these 
powers: to investigate (like police), to decide whether to bring 
charges (like grand juries), to prosecute (like district attorneys), and 
to decide guilt or innocence (like judges or juries).”24 
Central panels allow litigants challenging an agency decision to 
appear before a judge who is not also their adversary. Instead, such 
persons have the opportunity to appear before an ALJ that is 
independent from the agency at the heart of the dispute and receive 
an arguably unbiased review and decision.25 Many central panel 
directors have remarked based on their anecdotal experience that 
central panels produce more fair outcomes.26 But commentators 
report that some ALJs on central panels have expressed the view that 
they sometimes feel at least some continued pressure to rule in favor 
of agencies, particularly in systems where the panel is funded by the 
agencies.27 But such blatant interference appears uncommon.28 
However, some central panel systems are funded by charging the 
agencies for their costs and services at a billable rate.29 Some central 
panel systems, like Wisconsin and Michigan, seek to build 
safeguards into this process through a “Memorandum of 
Understanding” (MOU), which governs the relationship and funding 
                                                          
23 Interview with Judge Edward Schoenbaum. 
24 Wise, Louisiana's Division of Administrative LALJ: An Independent 
Administrative Hearings Tribunal, 30 J. National Association of Administrative 
Law Judges 95, 96 (2010). 
25 Interviews with central panel directors. 
26 Based on interviews with Judge Larry Craddock (Texas State Office of 
Administrative Hearings), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative 
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative 
Hearings Office, Senior ALJ), Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative 
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge). 
27 Hon. W. Michael Gillette, ALJ Central Panels: How is it Going Out There?, 
The Judicial Edge (2015). 
28 Id.  
29 Interviews with central panel directors. 
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arrangement between the central panel and each agency.30 Operating 
under such a MOU, however, requires significant administrative 
effort on an annual basis in order to negotiate the MOU with each 
agency and attempt to forecast the cost per case for that upcoming 
year.31 It is also reported to be difficult to resolve billing disputes that 
may arise with the agencies during the year.32 
Many central panel directors have remarked that funding plays an 
essential role in ensuring fairness. The vast majority believe that the 
best method of funding is an allocation from the state’s general 
assembly.33 This approach provides a source of funding independent 
of the agencies served by the central panel and allows for more 
independent operations by the central panel agency. 
Creating an advisory council to give direction, policy counsel, 
and advice on the adoption of rules established by the central panel 
may be another way to increase fairness. For example, Maryland 
created the State Advisory Council on Administrative Hearings, 
which advises the chief administrative law judge.34 The Council also 
identifies issues that the administrative law judges should address 
and reviews matters relating to administrative hearings, the 
administrative process, and policies and regulations proposed by the 
chief ALJ.35 
In addition, at the advice of its State Advisory Council for 
Administrative Hearings, the North Dakota Office of Administrative 
Hearings (OAH) decided early on not to aggressively seek to include 
                                                          
30 Based on interviews with Brian Hayes (Wisconsin Division of Hearings and 
Appeals, Division Administrator) and Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative 
Hearing System, Executive Director). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Based on interviews with Judge Larry Craddock (Texas State Office of 
Administrative Hearings), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative 
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative 
Hearings Office, Senior ALJ), Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative 
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Brian Hayes (Wisconsin Division of 
Hearings and Appeals, Division Administrator), Chris S eppanen (Michigan 
Administrative Hearing System, Executive Director), John Allen (Cook County 
Department of Administrative Hearings, Former Director). 
34 Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings Origins & Functions, 
Maryland.gov, http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/25ind/html/01adminf.html. 
35 Id. 
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agencies within its jurisdiction, but rather to encourage agencies to 
voluntarily use OAH.36 It should be noted, however, that other 
central panel systems found it advantageous to work diligently to 
include as many case types and agencies as possible from the panel’s 
inception.37 
An issue that straddles the notions of fairness, independence, and 
accountability is evaluation of ALJ performance. Opponents of any 
type of evaluation of ALJs look to general jurisdiction judges as 
examples. According to this view, other judges are not evaluated 
formally on a regular basis because they must enjoy absolute 
independence if the judicial system is to remain impartial. But 
general jurisdiction judges in many states are subject to retention 
election through which voters must vote affirmatively to allow these 
individuals to maintain their judicial seats. Proponents of evaluation 
claim that the public is owed a system that is transparent and 
accountable—one that includes a system that identifies areas of 
weakness for each administrative law judge and makes 




Central panels are credited with fostering better allocation of state 
agency resources and producing greater efficiency in administrative 
adjudication.38 They are also credited with producing more 
                                                          
36 Allen C. Hoberg, Ten Years Later: The Progress of State Central Panels, J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 239 (2001). 
37 Based on interviews with Tammy L. Pust (Minnesota Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Chief Judge); Brian Hayes (Wisconsin Division of 
Hearings and Appeals, Division Administrator); Chris Seppanen (Michigan 
Administrative Hearing System, Executive Director). 
38 Thomas E. Ewing, Oregon's Hearing Officer Panel, 23 , J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 57 (2003) (detailing the increased efficiency effectuated by 
adopting a central panel in Oregon); James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the 
State Administrative Law Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ 
Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN L. REV. 1355, 1383 (2002) 
(noting that central panels often render better decisions than those adjudicators 
employed by a single agency); Christopher B. McNeil, Similarities and Differences 
Between Judges in the Judicial Branch and the Executive Branch: The Further 
Evolution of Executive Adjudication Under the Administrative Central Panel, 18 , 
J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (1998) (advocating for the adoption of 
central panel systems for administrative adjudication); Karen Y. Kauper, Note, 
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systematic and uniform agency decision-making.39 Central panel 
directors commented that increased efficiency is "one of the most 
underrated benefits of the system.”40 
The Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings, for example, 
prides itself on issuing a decision on every hearing in ninety days or 
less.41 Michigan eliminated thousands of administrative rules to 
create a uniform set of rules governing all administrative cases.42 One 
goal of this effort was to make the process more clear and predictable 
to the parties.43 New York City similarly recommended that its 
central panel create its own standard rules and procedures, rather than 
adopting the multiple sets of rules and procedures utilized by each of 
the different agencies.44 Centralizing the process by placing ALJs and 
associated staff under one umbrella also reduces the overall costs 
associated with hearing cases and, generally, more cases can be heard 
by fewer ALJs.45 Several directors also credit the central panel 
system with clearing case backlogs, since the central panel has more 
flexibility to add ALJs in certain subject areas when those areas 
experience a higher volume of cases.46 
There is some concern, however, that too much focus on 
efficiency may create problems—specifically in regard to the 
                                                          
Protecting the Independence of Administrative Law Judges: A Model 
Administrative Law Judges Corps Statute, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 537, 543 
(1985) (applauding the benefits of the central panel paradigm). 
39 Interviews with central panel directors. 
40 Id. 
41 The Office of Administrative Hearings, Maryland.gov, 
http://www.oah.state.md.us/. 
42 Based on interview with Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative Hearing 
System, Executive Director). 
43 Id. 
44 Based on interview with Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of 
Administrative Trials and Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge). 
45 Based on interviews with Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of 
Administrative Trials and Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge) and Chris 
Seppanen (Michigan Administrative Hearing System, Executive Director). 
46 Based on interviews with Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of 
Administrative Trials and Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Samuel P. 
Langholz (former Chief Administrative Law Judge and Administrator, Iowa 
Administrative Hearings Division), Allen C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Former Director). 
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imposition of quotas. A study of the Virginia Social Security ALJs 
found that: 
 
[T]he requirement to schedule 40 cases per month, on 
average, is not reasonably attainable, nor is it 
reasonable to expect ALJs to achieve 500–700 case 
dispositions annually while also complying with SSA 
directives on legally sufficient decisions. Obviously, 
opinions could vary about how challenging 
“reasonably attainable” goals should be, and some 
might prefer more or less stringent challenges.47 
 
The Chief ALJ of the Florida Division of Administrative 
Hearings commented that while the Florida legislature has statutory 
mandates for certain cases to be resolved in a certain timeframe, he 
also has a collaborative relationship with the legislature allowing him 
to offer input on the feasibility of such standards.48 In addition, these 
timeframes have been amended and revised over time to fit the 
current realities of the panel.49 
Such flexibility and open communication between the panel and 
the legislature has ensured that the panel hears cases efficiently and 
in a timely manner while also ensuring that ALJs allocate the 
appropriate time to each case—allowing extensions in the interest of 
due process where necessary.50 Thus, consultation of ALJs before 
setting quotas and the willingness to be flexible in adjusting such 
standards appears to go a long way to prevent the aforementioned 
issues.51 
                                                          
47 Administrative Law Judge Work Analysis Study, Human Resources 
Research Organization (2015), vi, 
https://drive.google.com/a/jd16.lALJ.harvard.edu/file/d/0B2kAAfgH45ClZjRGejd
wSkwyNXc/vie w?p li=l. 
48 Based on interview with Robert Cohen (Florida State Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Based on interviews with Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of 
Administrative Trials and Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Samuel P. 
Langholz (former Chief Administrative Law Judge and Administrator, Iowa 
Administrative Hearings Division), Allen C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Former Director). 
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C. Cost Reduction 
 
Proponents of a centralized administrative system argue it results 
in reduced costs due to economies of scale and flexibility. The 
benefits of economies of scale are most apparent for agencies that 
have high- volume hearing needs, such as a thousand or more annual 
referrals.52 
A hearing officer issuing 1,000 orders a month can do so more 
efficiently than one issuing 100, for example, because of shared 
resources such as case management systems, operational staff, 
vehicles, office space, etc.53 In addition, a larger hearing office has 
the capacity to absorb a greater amount of additional work than a 
smaller office.54 
The benefits of flexibility in case assignment are most visible for 
agencies with low-volume hearing needs (a few hundred referrals a 
year).55 A centralized system allows a chief ALJ to assign ALJs a 
variety of cases with different subject matters depending on the 
ALJ’s expertise.56 “The resulting flexibility in case assignments bore 
fruit in reductions of redundant staff, monetary cost savings, or both 
in Colorado, New Jersey, Texas, and Minnesota."57 
An indication of the savings that may be anticipated by the 
institution of a central hearing panel is supplied by Oregon’s 
experience, which first showed a fiscal impact in FY 2000–01. There 
were cost reductions in hours per case referral (down 17 percent), 
cost per referral (down 11 percent), cost of Department of 
Transportation referrals (down six percent, saving $37 million) and 
cost of Department of Human Services referrals (down 23 percent).58 
 
                                                          
52 John Hardwicke & Thomas E. Ewing, The Central Panel: A Response to 
Critics, 24 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 231, 233 (2004). 
53 Id. at 234. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 233. 
56 Id. at 233–34. 
57 Id. at 236–37. 
58 Id. at 234. 
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D. Hiring, Training, and Supervision 
 
Central panel directors appear to place an emphasis on hiring and 
the need to select highly qualified applicants to fill ALJ positions. 
This includes applicants who have practiced law for a number of 
years and have prior experience handling cases before an 
administrative court or other trial experience.59 The basic idea is that 
hiring highly qualified lawyers as ALJs will enhance fairness, 
efficiency, and the overall quality of administrative hearings for all 
parties involved. 
Many proponents of central panels suggest that newly hired ALJs 
should receive further training by virtue of the work they perform 
under the central panel system. For example, the former Chief ALJ of 
the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board argued that the central panel 
structure “will place the management and training of all ALJs in the 
hands of experienced officials whose understanding and appreciation 
of the duties and responsibilities of the office come from their actual 
performance of such duties and responsibilities.”60 Many central 
panel directors reported sending new hires to the 4-hour National 
Judicial College training in Reno, complying with the required CLE 
training requirements for all lawyers, as well as conducting an annual 
training in addition to informal on- the-job training.61 
In California, new ALJs complete a year-long probation and 
mentoring program, which includes conducting mock hearings and 
                                                          
59 Based on interviews with Judge Larry Craddock (Texas State Office of 
Administrative Hearings), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative 
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative 
Hearings Office, Senior ALJ), Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative 
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge); Tammy L. Pust (Minnesota Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Chief Judge). 
60 Gerald E. Ruth, Unification of the Administrative Adjudicatory Process: An 
Emerging Framework to Increase "Judicialization" in Pennsylvania, J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 245 (1996). 
61 Based on interviews with Judge Larry Craddock (Texas State Office of 
Administrative Hearings), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative 
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative 
Hearings Office, Senior ALJ), Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative 
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge); Brian Hayes (Wisconsin Division of 
Hearings and Appeals, Division Administrator); Cynthia Eyre (Louisiana Division 
of Administrative LALJ, former General Counsel). 
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issuing practice decisions under the observation and review of an 
ALJ mentor. Before issuing their first decisions, new ALJs’ opinions 
are reviewed by both their mentor and a more senior ALJ.62 
Many states provide only limited ALJ supervision after the initial 
training period, if any. For example, ALJs often issue their own 
decisions without any kind of evaluation prior to issuance.63 In other 
states, the director observes hearings conducted by new ALJs and 
then provides feedback on the hearing and written decision.64 
 
E. Generalist v. Specialist ALJs  
 
An important consideration for states implementing a central 
panel system is whether the panel will consist of specialist ALJs, who 
hear certain case topics exclusively or almost exclusively, or 
generalist ALJs, who hear a variety of cases. 
The generalist system can combat ALJ insularity and 
complacency as well as the appearance of ALJ bias in favor of the 
agency, since ALJs work on a variety of cases originating from 
different agencies.65 Further, a generalist system allows central panel 
directors more flexibility to assign ALJs to different depending on 
caseloads, thereby reducing costs and increasing the speed with 
which cases are heard.66 
Directors commented that ALJs prefer the generalist system with 
a more diversified caseload over hearing the same type of case over 
                                                          
62 Based on interview with Alicia Boomer (California Office of Administrative 
Hearings, Senior Counsel). 
63 Based on interviews with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality 
Assurance); Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of Administrative Trials and 
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge); Samuel P. Langholz (former Chief 
Administrative Law Judge and Administrator, Iowa Administrative Hearings 
Division). 
64 Based on interview with Allen C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Former Director). 
65 Based on interviews with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality 
Assurance) and J. Richard Collier (Office of Tennessee Secretary of State, Chief 
Administrative Judge, Administrative Procedures Division). 
66 Based on interview with Brian Hayes (Wisconsin Division of Hearings and 
Appeals, Division Administrator). 
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and over;67 however, some cases require highly technical expertise, 
which can be difficult for ALJs to acquire across several different 
areas of law.68 One director described the question of whether to 
make ALJs generalist or specialists as a “constant tension.”69 
Interviews and surveys with ALJs indicate a strong relationship 
between hearing more than one type of case and job satisfaction. 
In order to capture the benefits from both the specialist and 
generalist system, some states opt for a hybrid system where 
specialized ALJs hear more complicated or technical cases and other 
ALJs hear a variety of different cases.70 
States can consider placing ALJs in tiers based on their 
experience to most effectively capture the benefits of both the 
generalist and specialist systems. Based on our interviews, such a 
promotional system would likely incentivize ALJs to work hard and 
increase their knowledge base in order to earn the promotion to a 
higher tier.71 Additionally, this system would afford central panel 
directors the ability to maintain staffing flexibility by assigning 
higher- tiered ALJs to adjudicate cases along with lower-tiered ALJs 
during periods of increased caseloads.72 The hybrid system could also 
                                                          
67 Based on interviews with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality 
Assurance) and J. Richard Collier (Office of Tennessee Secretary of State, Chief 
Administrative Judge, Administrative Procedures Division). 
68 Based on interviews with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality 
Assurance). 
69 Based on interview with Samuel P. Langholz (former Chief Administrative 
Law Judge and Administrator, Iowa Administrative Hearings Division). 
70 Based on interviews with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality 
Assurance), Judge Larry Craddock (Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings, 
Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative 
Law Judge). 
71 It is important for such a hybrid system to have the flexibility to absorb 
ALJs into higher tiers when they meet certain benchmarks for advancement, rather 
than when there is an opening at the higher tier. One central panel director 
commented that morale problems are created when ALJs work to gain the 
knowledge and experience to advance to a higher tier but have to wait for a 
vacancy. 
72 Based on interviews with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality 
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combat ALJ complacency and the appearance of ALJ bias in favor of 
an agency, since higher-tiered ALJs can be assigned to lower-tiered 
cases in addition to adjudicating a variety of specialized cases. 
 
XI. INDEPENDENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 
 
Administrative law judge independence has always been at the 
heart of arguments by proponents of the central panel. Final decision-
making authority, as opposed to recommendations subject to agency 
review, is one means through which ALJ independence can be 
effectuated. Many central panel directors have commented that while 
administrative law judges’ opinions are often recommended 
decisions subject to agency review, the ALJs are empowered with the 
ability to create the record and make findings of fact, which is not 
subject to review or disturbed on review.73 Others noted that most 
recommendations become final. States adopting a central panel 
system must make this choice, and there is much division on which 
alternative produces the fairest outcome.74 
Before central panels, administrative adjudication was clearly the 
province of the agency. The contested case took place at the agency, 
and fact-finding done by the ALJ was just a preliminary step to the 
agencies rendering the final decision. ALJs were considered to be 
employees of the agency, there only to provide aid via a fact-finding 
function to facilitate agency decision-making. 
But the creation of the central panels transferred the focus of 
adjudication from the final agency decision to the decision- making 
by the ALJ. Legislatures that have provided for this change have 
                                                          
Assurance) and Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative Hearing System, 
Executive Director). 
73 Based on interviews with Judge Larry Craddock (Texas State Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative 
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative 
Hearings Office, Senior ALJ), Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative 
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge); Brian Hayes (Wisconsin Division of 
Hearings and Appeals, Division Administrator), Tammy L. Pust (Minnesota Office 
of Administrative Hearings, Chief Judge). 
74 Flanagan, supra note 38; James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in 
Central Panels and ALJ Final Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REV. 401 (2005); Final, 
But Often Fallible: Recognizing Problems with ALJ Finality, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 
53, 57 n.6 (2004). 
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been persuaded to do so in light of the hiring process, nonpartisan 
supervision, training, and overall independence of the central panel 
ALJ. 
In addition, giving final decision authority to central panel ALJs 
has a financial edge. ALJ finality allows a step in the process—
agency review—to be skipped, thereby providing for cost savings. 
Proponents of final decision authority view judicial review as a 
source of accountability within the system. 
To proponents, giving ALJs final decision authority combines the 
recognition that central panel ALJs are highly trained, well-
supervised administrative jurists with the benefits of cost savings 
provided by eliminating a major step in the process. 
But opponents look to the role of the administrative agency as the 
reason to oppose central panel ALJ final decision authority. In their 
view, agencies need that final power in order to maintain policy 
consistency. In contrast, proponents state that agencies can set forth 
their policy positions through rulemaking and that lawyers for the 
agency during administrative hearings are free to argue their claims 
based on policy set forth by the administrative agency. 
Proponents of central panel ALJ final decision authority also 
point to the potential abuse of power that could occur should 
agencies seek to overturn every central panel ALJ decision adverse to 
the agency. This would allow agencies to not only second-guess ALJ 
decisions applying policy to facts but to second-guess the fact-
finding of the ALJ as well. 
This protection from agency abuse is particularly pronounced in 
the increasing number of administrative law cases involving pro se 
litigants. These individuals, lacking legal representation, need the 
protection of an independent administrative process perhaps even 
more than cases in which parties are represented by legal counsel. 
This is one of the reasons why some legal aid lawyers to whom we 
spoke see the central panel as a protector of individual rights. 
Central panels have proven themselves to be laboratories of new 
ideas to provide administrative adjudication that is fair, efficient, and 
independent. As final decision authority for ALJs is debated on an 
ongoing basis, we have seen a hybrid approach being employed 
among existing central panels. 
There is a growing trend of legislatures providing for final 
decision authority to central panel ALJs in at least some matters. 
Georgia is the latest state legislature to do so. Agency personnel to 
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whom we spoke were much less opposed to final decision authority 
in cases where the adjudication has to do primarily with fact-finding 
and applying statutory law and conditions to the established set of 
facts. In more controversial, more complex cases involving legal 
representation for both parties, agencies are much less likely to want 
to give up control over review of the central panel ALJ decision-
making. 
What has occurred in a variety of states and municipalities is that 
as central panels become more accepted into the framework of 
administrative adjudication as independent, high-quality, well-trained 
adjudicators, opposition to final authority subsides. In fact, this 
process of acceptance has led to a phenomenal growth in the number 
of central panels as well as the jurisdictions covered by each. 
In general, there appears to be a spectrum of ALJ decision-
making authority and processes. For some central panel systems, 
decision-making authority is determined by the agency. In 
Wisconsin, the agency identifies whether they want a final or 
proposed decision at the time they provide the hearing order to the 
panel.75 In other states, like Maryland and North Dakota, the state 
legislature plays a role in determining whether ALJ decisions are 
final or recommendations.76 In New York City, ALJs only render 
recommendations; none of their decisions are final.77 Colorado ALJs 
have no other final decision-making authority beyond Secretary of 
State election disputes.78 In contrast, in North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Louisiana, the vast majority of decisions rendered by 
the ALJs are final.79 Florida ALJs have final decision-making 
                                                          
75 Id. 
76 Based on interviews with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality 
Assurance); Allen C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of Administrative Hearings, 
Former Director). 
77 Based on interview with Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of 
Administrative Trials and Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge). 
78 Based on interviews with Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado 
Administrative Hearings Office, Senior ALJ), Robert Cohen (Florida Division of 
Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge). 
79 Based on interviews with Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge); Cynthia Eyre 
(Louisiana Division of Administrative LALJ, former General Counsel). 
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authority over most cases in their jurisdiction, excluding professional 
licensure cases and school board cases.80  
The ALJs for the Cook County Parking Ticket Hearing Officer 
System only issue final decisions.81 This specific central panel 
system was built on this concept from its inception, based on a 
perspective that permitting an agency director to overturn a judge’s 
decision diminishes the value of the judge and the purpose of the 
process to create efficiency, fairness, and cost savings.82 
In Tennessee, most agencies request that the ALJs render “initial 
orders” subject to review by the agency director. If the initial order is 
not appealed within fifteen days, it becomes a final order.83 
Approximately 80–90% of the initial orders in Tennessee eventually 
become final orders.84 In Iowa, ALJs generally issue 
recommendations, at which time the parties always have a right of 
appeal directly to the agency, thereby permitting the agency to 
modify or overturn the ALJ’s decision.85 
Opponents of ALJ finality argue that agencies have greater 
knowledge and more expertise in the subject matters before the ALJs, 
and as such are the more-appropriate final decision makers.86 The 
general concern is the inconsistencies that may arise from ALJ 
finality if the agencies and ALJs are using different policy 
approaches.87 
Former Illinois Supreme Court Justice and law professor Frank 
Sullivan Jr., remarked: 
 
                                                          
80 Based on interview with Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative 
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge). 
81 Based on interview with John Allen (Cook County Department of 
Administrative Hearings, Former Director). 
82 Id. 
83 Based on interview with J. Richard Collier (Office of Tennessee Secretary of 
State, Chief Administrative Judge, Administrative Procedures Division). 
84 Id. 
85 Based on interview with Samuel P. Langholz (former Chief Administrative 
Law Judge and Administrator, Iowa Administrative Hearings Division). 
86 James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in Central Panels and ALJ 
Final Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REV. 419 (2005). 
87 Id. 
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We have seen already that removing policy 
considerations from administrative adjudications strips 
those decisions of the separation of powers 
justification for deference: they are no longer the 
decisions of the entity under the Constitution with 
primacy for executing policy on that subject. Indeed, 
does the exhaustion doctrine—that a party must 
exhaust administrative remedies before seeking 
judicial review—have the same vitality under central 
panels if there is a non-deferential standard of review? 
Without a deferential standard of review, I think the 
very legitimacy conferred on administrative law judge 
decisions by virtue of those judges being accountable 
within the executive branch is arguably removed.88 
 
Further, there are some cases where even proponents of finality in 
ALJ decision-making agree that the agency should have final 
decision-making authority. For example, where the agency at issue is 
an elected board or commission, allowing the ALJ final decision-
making authority would usurp the authority of officials chosen by the 
electorate specifically to make such decisions.89 
Central panel directors have differing opinions on this topic. 
Some agree that agencies have greater expertise and therefore should 
have final decision authority.90 In response, proponents of finality in 
ALJ decisions argue that these decisions are still appealable and 
reviewable by a court. In addition, agencies or legislatures could 
consider reserving recommended decisions to only those specialized 
areas where level of ALJ expertise is a particular concern. Other 
proponents have argued that vesting final decision-making authority 
                                                          
88 Frank Sullivan, Jr., Some Questions to Consider Before Indiana Creates a 
Centralized Office of Administrative Hearings, IND. L. REV. 397 (2005). 
89 Based on interviews with Allen C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Former Director) and Robert Cohen (Florida Division of 
Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge). 
90 Based on interviews with Judge Larry Craddock (Texas State Office of 
Administrative Hearings), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative 
Hearings, Chief Administrative law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative 
Hearings Office, Senior ALJ), Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative 
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge). 
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in the ALJ results in cost savings and greater efficiency and fairness 
for litigants, as it eliminates a step in the process—allowing litigants 
to go from an administrative trial directly to the appeal, thereby 
streamlining and simplifying the process.91 
Permitting ALJ finality and removing agency review also 
minimizes the perception of impropriety by not permitting an agency 
to appeal or overturn an unfavorable decision. Indeed, in North 
Dakota, from time to time where the ALJ’s decision is not final, 
agencies ask the ALJ to make final decisions in difficult or 
controversial cases in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety. 
One chief ALJ commented that a drawback of giving ALJs such 
authority could be heightened scrutiny of the panel by the agency 
when the ALJ renders unfavorable decisions.92 While a consensus 
has not been issued on the question of ALJ finality, opponents and 
proponents seem to agree that agency policy should always be the 
cornerstone of decision-making. 
Finally, there may be cost savings that accrue to final decision- 
making authority. In cases where ALJs have such authority, agencies 
and litigants do not have to expend time and money on a second-
stage adjudication. 
 
A. A Legislative Case Study in Imposing Final Decision-Making 
Authority: Georgia  
 
On May 8, 2018, the governor of the state of Georgia signed 
House Bill 790 (H.B. 790) into law. The purpose of H.B. 790 was to 
implement various legal and systemic changes recommended by the 
state’s Court Reform Council to streamline the state administrative 
hearing process and increase the public’s perception of fairness in the 
judicial system. We detail the ways in which H.B. 790 has altered the 
landscape of administrative law within the state of Georgia, with a 
focus on the newly enhanced power of ALJs to issue final decisions 
in “contested cases." In an effort to facilitate a full understanding of 
the impact of the recently enacted legislation, the first section will 
                                                          
91 Based on interview with Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge). 
92 Based on interview with Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative Hearings 
Office, Senior ALJ). 
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describe the system of administrative hearings in place before H.B. 
790 was enacted, while the second section will explore the changes to 
the system that the new law has imposed and their anticipated impact. 
 
1. The Administrative Hearing System Before H.B. 790’s Enactment 
 
The Office of State Administrative Hearings (OSAH) was formed 
by the Georgia General Assembly in 1994 “as a new state agency.”93 
OSAH is situated within the state’s executive branch and is charged 
with “impartial administration of administrative hearings in 
accordance with the” Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.94 By 
law, OSAH must remain independent of other state administrative 
agencies.95 OSAH is headed by a chief ALJ, who is appointed by the 
governor for a renewable six-year term and is tasked with 
administering OSAH.96 The chief ALJ’s duties include the 
promulgation of rules, regulations, and procedures necessary for 
OSAH to carry out its duties97 and the appointment of all of OSAH 
ALJs.98 As of 2017, OSAH employs thirteen full-time ALJs, not 
including the chief ALJ.99 
OSAH’s operations are predicated on the referral of contested 
cases from state administrative agencies. “Whenever a state agency 
authorized by law to determine contested cases100 initiates or receives 
a request for a hearing in a contested case which is not presided over 
by the agency . . . ultimate decision maker, the hearing shall be 
                                                          
93 Mark A. Dickerson, The Georgia Office of State Administrative Hearings, 
19 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 121, 121 (1999). 
94 O.C.G.A. § 50-13-40(a) (2017). 
95 Id. 
96 See id. at (b)–(e). 
97 Id. at (c). 
98 Id. at (e). 
99 Meet Us: Judges, GEORGIA OFFICE OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, 
https://osah.ga.gov/meetus-judges/. 
100 The Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (Georgia APA) defines a 
contested case as “a proceeding, including, but not restricted to, rate making, price 
fixing, and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are 
required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing.” 
O.G.C.A. § 50-13-2(2) (2017). 
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conducted by” OSAH.101 It is important to note that prior to the 
promulgation of H.B. 790, agencies could hold onto hearing requests 
indefinitely, without referral, because there was no mandated time by 
which agencies were required to refer a request to OSAH for hearing. 
Despite the lack of time constraints on agency referral prior to the 
enactment of H.B. 790, in 2016, upwards of 50,000 cases were 
referred to and resolved by OSAH,102 while in 2017, OSAH resolved 
more than 41,000 cases.103 
Prior to the enactment of H.B. 790, the general rule regarding 
ALJ resolution of contested cases indicated that any ALJ decision 
regarding such a case was to be treated merely as an “initial 
decision.”104 Both before and after H.B. 790’s promulgation, any 
“initial decision” rendered by an ALJ is open to review within thirty 
days following its issuance, either upon the request of a party to the 
contested case or upon the relevant agency’s own initiative.105 If 
agency review is pursued, any decision rendered by the reviewing 
agency becomes a final decision.106 
                                                          
101 O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(a)(1) (2017). 
102 Survey of central panels conducted by the Louisiana Division of 
Administrative Law. This central panel agency issues on an annual basis 
demographic information on state-based central panels. 
103 STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT: COURT 
REFORM COUNCIL 8 (Nov. 20, 2017). 
104 O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(d) (“Except as otherwise provided in this article, in all 
cases every decision of an administrative law judge shall be treated as an initial 
decision...”). 
105 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-17(a) (2017) (“[I]n the absence of an application to 
the agency within 30 days from the date of notice of the initial decision for review, 
or an order by the agency within such time for review on its motion, the initial 
decision shall, without further proceedings become the decision of the agency.”). 
Note, when as agency reviews an ALJ initial decision, either upon the request of a 
party to the contested case or upon an agency’s own initiative, “the agency shall 
have all powers it would have in making the initial decision;” O.C.G.A. § 50-13-
17(a) (2017); but must “give due regard to the [ALJ’s] opportunity to observe 
witnesses[such that, if] the reviewing agency rejects or modifies a proposed finding 
of fact or a proposed decision, it shall give reasons for doing so in writing in the 
form of findings of fact and conclusions of law.” O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(d) (2017). 
106 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13(e)(1) (2017) (“A reviewing agency shall have a 
period of 30 days following the entry of the decision of the administrative law 
judge to reject or modify such decision.”); O.C.G.A. § 50-13-17(c) (2017) (“Each 
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Where a party to the contested case seeks to challenge this final 
decision, they are entitled to judicial review.107 In contrast, if an 
ALJ’s initial decision is not reviewed by an agency within thirty days 
of its rendition, it becomes a final decision.108 Both the Georgia case 
law and Georgia APA indicate that a party may not bypass agency 
review of an “initial decision” by seeking judicial review within the 
thirty-day period following an ALJ’s issuance of an “initial 
decision.”109 To do so would violate the principle of exhaustion, 
which is memorialized in the Georgia APA and asserts that, 
generally, a party may not seek judicial review of agency action 
unless they have exhausted all administrative remedies.110 Hence, in 
many respects, the statutory default rule in place prior to H.B. 790 
left ALJs without meaningful decision-making power because a party 
was required to take advantage of the two-tier system of review 
before they could seek outside judicial review. 
However, the Georgia statutes provided one important exception 
to this pre-H.B. 790 default rule: “[a]ny agency may provide by rule 
that proposed decisions in all or in specified classes of cases before 
                                                          
agency shall render a final decision in contested cases within 30 days after” an ALJ 
has rendered its initial decision). 
107 O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a) (2017). Note, if judicial review of the agency’s 
final decision is sought, the reviewing court is precluded from substituting its own 
“judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of 
fact.” O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h) (2017). 
108 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(e)(1) (2017) (“If a reviewing agency fails to reject 
or modify the decision of the administrative law judge within such 30 day period, 
then the decision of the administrative law judge shall stand affirmed by the 
reviewing agency by operation of law.”). 
109 See Department of Pub. Safety v. MacLafferty, 195 S.E.2d 748, 750 (Ga. 
1973) (“The Department contends that agency review [of an ALJ’s initial decision] 
provided in the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act is a necessary step in the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies required by the act as a prerequisite to 
judicial review...We agree.”). 
110 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19 (2017) (“Any person who has exhausted all 
administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a 
final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter.”) 
(emphasis added); Carnes v. Crawford, 272 S.E.2d 690, 691 (Ga. 1980) (“[U]nder 
the APA exhaustion of administrative remedies available within the agency is 
necessary for judicial review of a final decision in a contested case, and an 
aggrieved person who fails to seek review by the agency of an initial decision of a 
hearing officer has failed to exhaust administrative remedies.”). 
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the Office of State Administrative Hearings will become final 
without further agency action and without expiration of the 30-day 
review period otherwise provided for in this subsection.”111 Hence, 
agencies could voluntarily opt to delegate final decision-making 
authority to ALJs reviewing contested cases, thereby allowing parties 
to the case to circumvent the generally required second tier of agency 
review by applying directly for judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. 
As of 2017, multiple agencies with significant caseloads had availed 
themselves of this exception, opting to grant ALJs final decision-
making authority.112 
Among these agencies are the Department of Driver Services and 
the Department of Public Safety, which referred almost 13,000 cases 
to OSAH in the 2017 fiscal year, and the Department of Human 
Services and Office of Child Support Services, which referred almost 
9,000 cases to OSAH in the 2017 fiscal year.113 Hence, despite the 
default rule, ALJs exercised valid final decision-making authority in 
65% of all cases referred to OSAH in the 2017 fiscal year—almost 
27,000 contested cases.114 
Another important hindrance to the power and efficacy of ALJs 
before the enactment of H.B. 790 was their reliance on courts to 
sanction parties to the contested case and enforce subpoenas they had 
issued. Though ALJs were statutorily empowered to “sign and issue 
subpoenas,”115 if the party subpoenaed failed to comply the issuing 
ALJ could not simply enforce the subpoena but was forced to rely on 
a superior court to do so on its behalf.116 A party to the contested case 
could seek to enforce the subpoena as well but was also obligated to 
seek enforcement through the superior court.117 Additionally, where a 
party, or their agent, otherwise failed to comply with the ALJ’s 
requests or the general hearing process, an ALJ did not have the 
                                                          
111 O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(e)(3) (2017). 
112 STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 7–9. 
113 Id. at 7. 
114 Id. at 8–9. 
115 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(a)(2) (2017) (“An administrative law judge shall 
have the power to do all things specified in paragraph (6) of subsection (a) of Code 
Section 50-13-13.”); O.C.G.A. § 50- 13-13(a)(6) (2017) (“[T]he hearing officer . . . 
shall have authority to do the following: . . . sign and issue subpoenas”). 
116 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13(b) (2017). 
117 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13(a)(7) (2017). 
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authority to find the party in contempt and take appropriate action 
thereafter but, instead, was statutorily forced to rely upon the court to 
make such a finding.118 
 
“In proceedings before . . . the hearing officer . . . if 
any party . . . disobeys or resists any lawful order of 
process; or neglects to produce, after having been 
ordered to do so, any pertinent book, paper, or 
document; . . . or, upon appearing, refuses to take the 
oath or affirmation as a witness; or, taking the oath or 
affirmation, refuses to testify . . . [the] hearing officer . 
. . may certify the facts to the superior court of the 
county where the offense is committed for appropriate 
action, including a finding of contempt.”119 
 
Thus, in many respects, ALJs were reliant on the courts to 
enforce order in OSAH hearings, a framework of authority that 
results in significant inefficiency, requiring reliance on a superior 
court and delaying the overall hearing process.120 
On March 30, 2017, the Governor of the state of Georgia 
established the Court Reform Council (Council) by executive order 
for the purpose of reviewing “current practices and procedures within 
the judicial court system and the administrative law hearing system 
and mak[ing] recommendations to improve efficiencies and achieve 
best practices for the administration of justice.”121 Key stakeholders 
were appointed to the Council, including the state’s attorney general 
as well as the chief ALJ, the latter of which had long advocated for 
ALJ final decision-making authority and other reforms to the APA 
and OSAH hearing process that would improve efficiency.122 
In November 2017, the Council issued its Final Report, which 
contained several recommendations for changes to the administrative 
                                                          
118 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13(b) (2017). 
119 Id. 
120 STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 11. 
121 Ga. Exec Order No. 03.30.17.01 (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://gov.georgia.gov/sites/gov.georgia.gov/files/related_files/document/03.30.17
.01.pdf. 
122 See id. 
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hearing process.123 H.B. 790 was greatly informed by this Final 
Report and enacts the recommendations made by the Council’s 
Administrative Procedure Act Subcommittee.124 Discussing H.B. 790 
in a phone interview with Michael Malihi, the current chief ALJ, he 
disclosed that opposition to the Bill by government players and the 
public was virtually nonexistent.125 In fact, the Bill enjoyed wide 
support across party lines—in the House, the Bill was unopposed, 
while in the Senate only one party voted against passage.126 Mr. 
Malihi attributed this bipartisan support to the fact that the Bill’s 
proposed changes were viewed as a matter of fairness and justice, 
and therefore appealed to persons from across the political spectrum. 
 
2. The Administrative Hearing System After H.B. 790’s Enactment 
 
                                                          
123 STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103. 
124 See Ga. H.B. 790, Synopsis (2018). 
125 In the conversation, Mr. Malihi emphasized the importance of the inclusion 
of key stakeholders in the reform effort. He indicated that he had long discussed 
administrative reform within Georgia with Governor Deal, one of the many factors 
that catalyzed the Governor’s creation of the Council. Mr. Malihi stressed that a 
large portion of the reform’s success and wide acceptance was due to the 
Governor’s choice to appoint powerful state players, such as the attorney general, 
as well as key stakeholders, such as house and senate leaders, to membership in the 
Council. See Court Reform Council – Members, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY 
GENERAL CHRIS CARR, https://law.georgia.gov/court-reform-council-members 
(last visited June 20, 2018) (listing the final membership of the Court Reform 
Council); Ga. Exec Order No. 03.30.17.01 (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://gov.georgia.gov/sites/gov.georgia.gov/files/related_files/document/03.30.17
.01.pdf containing the original list of members appointed to the Court Reform 
Council). Ultimately, this strategy allowed crucial actors to deliberate about the 
system’s faults and come to a learned remedy, influenced by the needs of Georgia 
and the reform experiences of other states. Moreover, the inclusion of powerful 
actors gave the reform effort credibility while simultaneously assuring that such 
actors were involved in the recommendation process, thereby cementing their 
incentive to implement and support implementation of their own recommendations. 
126 2017-2018 Regular Session – HB 790, GEORGIA GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY LEGISLATION, http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-
US/display/20172018/HB/790 (last visited June 18, 2018). In the same phone 
conversation with Mr. Malihi, he disclosed that, to his knowledge, the single senate 
vote against the bill was attributable to an error on the part of the voter, who was 
confused about the voting process. 
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The impact of H.B. 790 has been significant on the administrative 
hearing process and the power of ALJs. The changes engendered by 
the Bill can be grouped into three main categories: increased final 
decision-making authority of ALJs; introduction of a concrete time 
by which agencies must refer hearing requests to OSAH; and 
increased ALJ enforcement powers. Each of these changes is 
explored below. 
 
i. The Introduction of ALJ Default Final Decision-Making Authority 
 
Chief among the changes memorialized in H.B. 790 is its 
expansion of ALJ final decision- making authority. Though, before 
the bill’s passage, a majority of cases referred to OSAH were in fact 
decided by ALJs with final decision-making authority, this authority 
did not exist by virtue of the ALJs’ own power but by the power 
agencies vested in ALJs through voluntarily electing to authorize 
ALJs to make such binding decisions. H.B. 790, however, functions 
to vest ALJs with final decision-making authority by default such 
that only in exceptional circumstances will the decisions of ALJs be 
considered merely “initial decisions.”127 Hence, the new default rule 
would generally eliminate the two-tier system of review because an 
ALJ’s decision would be final, automatically entitling the parties to 
seek judicial review upon the decision’s rendition.128 
The exceptions to this new default rule are limited and fall 
directly in line with the recommendations of the Council’s 
Administrative Procedure Act Subcommittee. These 
recommendations suggest that an exception should “be made for 
cases referred by agencies that are (i) responsible for licensing and 
supervising professionals, and which are comprised of members 
selected by the governor for their expertise in their respective fields; 
and (ii) [agencies that] were constitutionally created or are headed by 
constitutional officers.”129 Thus, in the case that a referring agency is 
                                                          
127 Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(c) (2018) (“Except as provided in subsection (d) of 
this Code section, every decision of an administrative law judge shall be a final 
decision as set forth in subsection (b) of Code Section 50-13- 17.”). 
128 See id. 
129 STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 6. In an 
interview with Mr. Malihi, he indicated that the exceptions were in part borne of 
constitutional concerns and in part borne of pragmatism. The constitutional 
   
Fall 2019    The Need for a Central Panel Approach 43 
‘a constitutional board of commission; an elected constitutional 
officer in the executive branch of this state; or a board, bureau, 
commission, or other agency of the executive branch of . . . [the state 
of Georgia] created for the purpose of licensing or otherwise 
regulating or controlling any profession, business, or trade . . . [and 
the] members thereof are appointed by the Governor it is termed a 
“reviewing agency.”’130 
Any decision an ALJ renders regarding a contested case referred 
to OSAH by a reviewing agency is merely an initial decision.131 
Hence, in such a situation, the two-tier decision- making process 
remains, such that the agency may review the ALJ’s initial decision 
and render a final decision thereon.132 Only after this final decision is 
rendered, or the ALJ’s initial decision has been unchallenged for 
thirty days following its rendition, will a party to the contested case 
be deemed to have exhausted all administrative remedies such that 
they become entitled to judicial review.133 Note, however, that the 
voluntary exception for agency delegation of final decision-making 
authority still remains.134 Hence, even though an agency may fall 
under the umbrella of “reviewing agency,” it can nonetheless 
                                                          
concerns arose regarding the grant of final decision- making authority to ALJs in 
cases referred by agencies that were constitutionally created or headed by 
constitutional officers. 
The pragmatic concerns arose regarding those agencies charged with licensing 
and supervising professionals, of which there were too many within the state to 
simply accord ALJs final decision- making authority without significant 
complication and possible agency opposition. 
130 Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(d)(1) (2018). At the time of the Council’s Final 
Report, it was estimated that this exception would encompass the “Professional 
Licensing Boards Division; [the] Professional Standards Commission; [the] Real 
Estate Appraisers and Real Estate Commission; [the] Department of Insurance; 
[the] State Personnel Board; [the] Secretary of State, Elections Division; [the] 
Secretary of State, Commissioner or Securities; [the] Peace Officer Standards and 
Training Council; [the] Composite Medical Board; [the] Board of Medical 
Examiners; [and the] Office of the Governor.” STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM 
COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 6. 
131 Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(d)(2) (2018) (“[I]n all contested cases referred by a 
reviewing agency, every decision of an administrative law judge shall be treated as 
an initial decision”). 
132 See Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(d)(1),(2) (2018). 
133 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19 (2017). 
134 Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(d)(5) (2018). 
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voluntarily choose to delegate final decision-making authority to 
ALJs with regards to some or all of the cases that it refers to OSAH. 
This single reform alone, even allowing for the exceptions, will 
have a tremendous impact on the efficiency of the administrative 
system and the power of ALJs. In its final report, the Council 
estimated that this reform would increase the percentage of ALJ final 
decision-making in contested cases from 65% to 99.6% in a single 
fiscal year.135 It is anticipated that H.B. 790’s effective consolidation 
of the two-tier review system into a single tier will greatly increase 
the efficiency of the administrative hearing process in Georgia.136 
Not only does the new single-tier system have the potential to result 
in faster proceedings—the Council estimates that the total duration of 
the proceedings will be reduced by some thirty to sixty days—but 
this increase in judicial economy will ease the burden on taxpayers 
and “[r]educe the overall litigation costs for the parties.”137 
Moreover, the single-tier system will increase the public’s perception 
of justice in the administrative hearing process as a single tier of 
review lends a stronger appearance of impartiality and finality to the 
process.138 
However, in its Final Report, the Council indicated that a possible 
disadvantage to the new system would be the reduction in “agencies’ 
authority over decisions directly affecting them.”139 This is of 
particular concern where a contested case requires that a decision 
maker have some level of expertise in the field at issue.140 Whereas 
“[a]gencies are staffed with experts in their respective fields” this is 
not the case with OSAH and may give rise to problems when ALJ 
resolution of a complex issue requires heightened knowledge.141 
 
ii. The Introduction of Time Constraints on Agency Referral of 
Hearing Requests 
                                                          
135 STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 8. 
136 See id. at 7. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. (“Finality strengthens the appearance of impartiality, as an agency can 
no longer overturn decisions issued by an impartial body.”) 
139 Id. at 10. 
140 See STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 10. 
141 Id. 
   
Fall 2019    The Need for a Central Panel Approach 45 
 
Another means by which H.B. 790 has increased efficiency is its 
imposition of time constraints on agency referral of hearing requests 
to OSAH. As mentioned above, prior to H.B. 790 there was no time 
by which an agency was required to refer an administrative hearing 
request to OSAH.142 This had the potential to work great hardship on 
parties seeking a hearing because, absent agency referral to OSAH, a 
party could not directly petition OSAH for such a hearing. Indeed, 
this resulted in significant time delays in resolution of contested cases 
and even intentional agency failure to refer that resulted in hearing 
requests being held indefinitely without any resolution of the 
underlying contested case. As such, prior to H.B. 790’s enactment, 
parties seeking an administrative hearing were at the whim of 
agencies with regards to when their cases would be heard and even if 
their cases would be heard at all. 
The Council recognized this as a significant fault in the Georgia 
administrative hearing system and recommended that the agencies be 
bound to refer hearing requests to OSAH by a concrete time.143 H.B. 
790 implemented this recommendation such that agencies that have 
received “a request for a hearing in a contested case . . . [must] 
forward such a request for a hearing to the Office of State 
Administrative Hearings within a reasonable time not to exceed 30 
days after receipt of such request.”144 Perhaps even more impactful 
than this referral time limitation is the solution the legislation 
provides when an agency has not complied with the newly 
established referral period. “If an agency fails [to refer a hearing to 
OSAH in accordance with the 30-day limitation] . . . the party 
requesting the hearing may petition the Office of State 
Administrative Hearings for an order permitting such party to file a 
request for a hearing directly with the Office of State Administrative 
Hearings.”145 Hence, this addition to the law is quite impactful, not 
only requiring agency action by a certain point but also providing 
persons with a simple solution that fulfills their needs if an agency 
fails to comply. 
                                                          
142 Id. at 13. 
143 Id. 
144 Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(a)(1) (2018). 
145 Id. (emphasis added). 
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As with the case of the augmentation of ALJ final decision-
making authority, the imposition of an OSAH referral deadline and 
an attendant right to petition OSAH directly is anticipated to have 
significant positive effects on the administrative hearing system. The 
change is likely to increase the efficiency of the system as it will 
“[reduce] any lag time between a party’s request for a hearing and 
OSAH’s docketing of the case.”146 Moreover, the new time constraint 
leaves parties seeking to avail themselves of the administrative 
infrastructure with greater “certainty as to when their cases will be 
received and docketed by OSAH for hearing.”147 
In its Final Report, the Council indicated that one possible 
disadvantage of this new time constraint is that it may negatively 
impact an agency’s ability to resolve the request outside of the 
hearing process.148 Before referring a hearing request to OSAH, 
agencies often attempt to settle a case with the parties involved.149 
Where an agency proceeds this way and has reached a potential 
settlement, it must wait for internal boards or commissions to 
approve the recommended settlement.150 Often, the meetings of these 
internal bodies take place months apart, a cause for significant delay 
in the resolution process.151 Thus, a statutory mandate that agencies 
refer hearing requests to OSAH within thirty days of receipt clearly 
does not comport with the timeline for agency settlement outside of 
hearing. 
However, H.B. 790’s enactment is not likely to significantly 
impact this alternative resolution method because, where a requesting 
party has gained the statutory right to petition OSAH directly, they 
need not exercise this right immediately.152 If the agency 
                                                          






152 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(b) (2017) (“Nothing in this article shall affect, 
alter, or change the ability of the parties to reach informal disposition of a contested 
case in accordance with paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of Code Section 50-13-
13.”); O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13(a)(4) (“Unless precluded by law, informal disposition 
may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order, 
or default”). 
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communicates with the party and is transparent about the timeline for 
settlement and settlement approval, there is a high likelihood that 
requesting parties will refrain from petitioning OSAH in favor of 
awaiting the resolution of a settlement. Where a party has so 
refrained but is ultimately unsatisfied with the settlement procedure 
or resolution, they are free to petition OSAH at any point during the 
process or thereafter if thirty days has lapsed since their initial 
hearing request. 
 
iii. The Augmentation of ALJ Enforcement Authority 
 
Another important impact of H.B. 790 is its augmentation of ALJ 
enforcement authority where participants in a hearing fail to 
cooperate. With the enactment of this legislation, ALJs are now able 
to enforce subpoenas they have personally issued, without the need to 
first seek the assistance of a superior court for enforcement.153 
Moreover, ALJs are now statutorily empowered to impose civil 
penalties . . . [for a person’s failure] to obey any lawful process or 
order of the administrative law judge or any rule or regulation 
promulgated under [the Georgia APA] . . . for any indecorous or 
improper conduct committed in the presence of the administrative 
law judge, or for submitting pleadings or papers for an improper 
purpose or containing frivolous arguments that have no evidentiary 
support.154 
Where an ALJ has imposed such civil penalties, they may apply 
to “the superior court of the county in which the violation is 
committed . . . to enforce by proper proceedings any lawful process 
or order of civil penalties of the administrative law judge.”155 
As is the case with the other changes engendered by the passage 
of H.B. 790, ALJs’ augmented enforcement authority is anticipated 
to improve the efficiency of the administrative hearings process. 
“Allowing for imposition of sanctions lessens the need for parties to 
                                                          
153 See Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(b) (2018) (“Subpoenas shall be enforced pursuant 
to subsection (a) of this code section); id. at Sec. 3(a) (“An administrative law 
judge shall have the power to impose civil penalties pursuant to paragraph (3) of 
this subsection for failing to obey any lawful process or order of the administrative 
law judge or any rule or regulation promulgated under this article”). 
154 See Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(a)(2) (2018). 
155 Id. 
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seek action in superior courts [for enforcement] while their case is 
ongoing.”156 Moreover, this increased power of ALJs is predicted to 
discourage parties from seeking subpoenas for persons they know 
will not appear or submitting improper pleadings, both of which are 
calculated to delay the process, effectively functioning as 
unauthorized continuances.157 Furthermore, it is likely this 
augmented ALJ power will contribute to the perception that ALJs 
have the jurisdiction to rule on contested cases and maintain order in 
their hearings—further indication that ALJs are fair and impartial 
arbiters of the law rather than agency rubberstamps or mere hearing 




H.B. 790 has greatly impacted the landscape of the administrative 
hearing process in the state of Georgia. The bill was a response to the 
Court Reform Council’s Final Report—an effort to implement the 
recommendations therein, themselves a product of learned 
observation as well as collaboration and negotiation of key 
stakeholders within the state. The recently enacted legislation’s 
introduction of default ALJ final decision-making, time constraints 
on agency referral of hearing requests, and augmented ALJ 
enforcement authority is predicted by proponents to positively impact 
the state’s administrative hearing process in two main ways. First, the 
administrative hearing process is likely to become much more 
efficient as the former two-tier contested case review process has 
largely been disposed of, and ALJs no longer need to rely on superior 
courts to issue civil penalties for non-cooperation by persons in 
anticipation of and during hearings. Second, these changes are likely 
to contribute to the perception that ALJs and the larger OSAH 
hearing process are just and impartial, as the decisions of ALJs are, 
generally, no longer subject to agency review, and ALJs are now 
empowered to issue civil penalties—both an indication that ALJs are 
more than simply agency rubber stamps or mere hearing officers. 
 
                                                          
156 STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 11. 
157 See id. 
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B. Addressing Agency Concerns with the Central Panel System  
 
The vast majority of central panel systems have had to address 
agency concerns relating to the creation or expansion of a central 
panel system. The primary agency concerns were (a) loss of control 
of the process and (b) loss of subject matter expertise.158 The 
Michigan Administrative Hearing System (MAHS) overcame the 
agency concern of loss of control through the creation of an MOU 
setting forth the responsibilities of the referring agency and the 
central panel, including how a hearing request would be processed, 
approximately how long the process would take, etc.159 Other central 
panel systems highlighted for the agencies the benefits of: 
 
(a) case backlog removal; 
 
(b) increased efficiency in process and quicker 
adjudication of cases; and 
 
(c) cost savings due to no longer needing a hearing 
support staff, which was persuasive160 Many central 
panel systems also agreed to hire agency ALJs.161 
                                                          
158 Based on interviews with Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative 
Hearing System, Executive Director), John Allen (Cook County Department of 
Administrative Hearings, Former Director), Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Administrative law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality 
Assurance), Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of Administrative Trials and 
Hearings, Chief Administrative law Judge), J. Richard Collier (Office of Tennessee 
Secretary of State, Chief Administrative Judge, Administrative Procedures 
Division), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings, Chief 
Administrative law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative Hearings Office, 
Senior ALJ), Allen C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of Administrative Hearings, 
Former Director) and Cynthia Eyre (Louisiana Division of Administrative LALJ, 
former General Counsel). 
159 Based on interview with Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative Hearing 
System, Executive Director). 
160 Based on interviews with John Allen (Cook County Department of 
Administrative Hearings, Former Director), Cynthia Eyre (Louisiana Division of 
Administrative LALJ, former General Counsel). 
161 Based on interviews with John Allen (Cook County Department of 
Administrative Hearings, Former Director), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge). 
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MAHS addressed the agencies and special interest groups’ concerns 
of lack of expertise in technical, complex, or specialized subject 
matters through further utilizing the MOU approach. More 
specifically, pursuant to the MOU, MAHS and the agency agreed that 
they would jointly agree on the ALJs assigned to those specialized 
cases.162 Other central panel systems stressed to the agencies the 
caliber of highly qualified individuals hired for the ALJ position.163 
Some agencies ultimately opted to exempt from the central panel 
system a certain subset of their hearings on highly technical or 
specialized matters.164 Other agencies requested only proposed 
decisions for those specialized cases, thereby retaining final decision-
making authority.165 
However, with time, the agencies become comfortable with the 
compromises and utilization of the central panels.166 No state that has 
adopted a central panel has returned to its previous practice. For a 
further discussion about addressing agency concerns with the central 
panel system, please see the results of the survey conducted with 
central panel directors beginning on page 67 of this report. 
 
XII. GROWTH IN THE CENTRAL PANEL MOVEMENT 
                                                          
162 Based on interview with Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative Hearing 
System, Executive Director). 
163 Based on interview with John Allen (Cook County Department of 
Administrative Hearings, Former Director). 
164 Based on interview with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Administrative law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality 
Assurance). 
165 Id. 
166 Based on interviews with Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative 
Hearing System, Executive Director), John Allen (Cook County Department of 
Administrative Hearings, Former Director), Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of 
Administrative Hearings, Administrative law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality 
Assurance), Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of Administrative Trials and 
Hearings, Chief Administrative law Judge), J. Richard Collier (Office of Tennessee 
Secretary of State, Chief Administrative Judge, Administrative Procedures 
Division), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings, Chief 
Administrative law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative Hearings Office, 
Senior ALJ), Allen C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of Administrative Hearings, 
Former Director) and Cynthia Eyre (Louisiana Division of Administrative LALJ, 
former General Counsel). 
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Since 1983, the central panel movement has grown from seven 
state central panels to more than 30 state and municipal panels. Some 
are exceptionally large, while some remain small. But the trend leans 
toward expansion in terms of the number of central panels, their 
jurisdiction, and final decision authority being granted to central 
panel ALJs. This growth can be attributed to a variety of reasons, but 
the most commonly cited include the recognition that central panels 
are free to hire experienced lawyers, provide them with substantial 
initial and ongoing training, and provide impartial and constructive 
evaluation of judicial performance as well as the perception that the 
central panel can provide independent decision-making at lower cost. 
Our interviews with central panel directors, ALJs, and 
administrative agency representatives lead to the following 
conclusions. 
Proponents of the central panel approach argue that the 
consumers of administrative adjudication appear to have accepted 
central panel ALJs as impartial arbiters. The independence of the 
central panels has led to improvements in the quality of hearings and 
decisions as well as the consistency and uniformity of the 
proceedings. The management and training of ALJs are perceived to 
be in the hands of experienced officials. While the increase in the 
number of new central panels has slowed since 2000, central panel 
directors noted in our interviews that the number of agencies using 
the services of the central panel has increased. 
Central panel directors also note that since 2000, they have seen 
within their central panel agencies the streamlining and improved 
effectiveness of data management and technology. This includes 
electronic submission, case management, videoconferencing to 
conduct and record hearings, establishing and maintaining a database 
of hearing decisions, and maintaining transparency through up-to-
date websites. Central panels have been responsible for producing 
codes of ethics for ALJs, uniform rules of procedure, and the 
enhanced use of alternative dispute resolution procedures. 
 
XIII. SURVEY RESULTS: A DESCRIPTION OF THE CENTRAL PANEL 
PHENOMENON 
 
We conducted a survey of central panel directors (CPDs) 
nationwide and received responses from twenty-five states. The 
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majority of the questions were answered by twenty-three central 
panel directors. The data below summarize the survey results. 
 
Fairness and Due Process 
Nearly half (11/23) of the central panel directors (CPDs) 
surveyed said they regularly obtain feedback, but 52% (12/23) said 
feedback is only provided occasionally or not at all. Directors in 
several states that do request feedback noted that response rates are 
low. In North Carolina the CPD has specifically charged the Deputy 
Director with improving the return rate. 
 
Hiring, Training, and Supervision 
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Other recruitment sources cited included the state bar association 
website and agency or state employment websites. 
Many states have few specific requirements beyond a license to 
practice law, though nearly half (10/23) specified that CPDs are 
required to have substantial or extensive experience. Most (8/10) of 
the states with experience requirements demand five or more years of 
practice. A few states define specific areas of required experience 
including administrative law and representing clients in both 
administrative and judicial proceedings. Other requirements worth 
noting include vetting by the governor’s office and an absence of 
financial conflicts of interest. 
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In nearly 2/3 (65%) of states, CPDs are appointed by the 
governor (or mayor, in municipalities). Several states (6/23) involve 
cabinet members in the selection and/or appointment process. In one 
state, a judicial selection panel makes a recommendation to the 
governor, while in another a vote is taken by the administrative law 
judges (ALJs). 
 
CPDs in 61% (14/23) of states have no term limits and/or serve at 
the pleasure of their superior, while 39% (9/23) of states specify term 
limits with lengths of four to six years. 
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A unique approach to CPD review of ALJ decisions is conducted 
in Alaska, where the CPD (Chief ALJ) and all the more senior ALJs 
participate in a peer review process; however, there is no top-down 
control of decisions and no right of appeal to the Chief ALJ. 
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Other managerial/administrative duties include: 
 
  hiring judges, 
  general administration of the court operations, 
  investigation allegations of misconduct and ethics of ALJs 
and hearing officers, 
  overseeing management of the Rules Division or 
appointing the Codifier of Rules for the State, 
  overseeing management of the Civil Rights Division, which 
is charged with investigation of claims of discrimination 
by state employees, 
  serving as a member of the Governor’s Cabinet, and 
  presiding over a limited docket of cases. 
 
No formal evaluation process for CPDs exists in more than half 
(12/23) of the states, but evaluation procedures that are in practice 
include: 
 
  yearly performance plan; 
  quarterly performance measures and annual details review 
by the governor’s office 
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  number of cases heard, appeal rate of decisions, and 
customer satisfaction rating; 
  constant evaluation by employees and agencies in their 
feedback to the governor and umbrella organization’s 
director 
  oversight committee with four members of the legislature, 
representative from governor’s office, and three attorneys; 
and 
  legislators review, question, and modify the central panel’s 
budget and compel supporting data. 
 
 
Procedures for removing directors vary, but 8/23 states remove 
directors for cause, 8/23 states remove directors at the pleasure of 
their superior, and in 5/23 states CPDs are employed at will. Other 
removal processes include: 
 
  by at least a 3-1 vote of the cabinet; the governor must be 
on the side voting to remove; 
  when term ends. Term is not concurrent with governor’s 
term and not at will; 
  upon appointment of a new director; 
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  with public employee protections, removal would be for 
cause (performance), promotion, or transfer with no loss 
of pay or classification; and 




Mandatory v. voluntary use of ALJs 
Cases reach the central panel for hearing through agency requests 
in nearly 70% (16/23) of states and through litigant requests in nearly 
40% (9/23) of states. Close to one third (7/23) of states use both 
methods. In several states CPDs noted that the method depends upon 
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Central panel use is always mandatory in only four (17%) states. 
Agency heads have the choice to hear cases within the agency or 
refer it to the central panel in slightly more than half (12/23) of the 
states. There are no states in which agency heads are allowed to refer 
cases outside of the agency to entities outside of the central panel. 
CPDs in nearly half (11/23) of the states say it depends, but most of 
them (9/23) say that central panel use is mandatory in most cases 
with only specific exceptions or exemptions. 
 
ALJs – Generalist v. Specialist? 
 
CPD Perspective 
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More than half (13/23) of states assign ALJs on a case-by-case 
basis. Only two states (9%) assign ALJs to one agency for an 
extended period of time. One third of states use different methods to 
assign ALJs, including: 
 
  geographically for general jurisdiction ALJs and case-by-
case for specialized matters; 
  based on a circuit system; 
  assignments made monthly for case dockets; 
  ALJs are moved between eight main areas when caseloads 
fluctuate; 
  some are by batch, others case by case; 
  most cases are set on pre-calendared dates to which an ALJ 
is already assigned; 
  some are case-by-case; most develop an expertise (e.g., 
Medicaid cases and workers compensation cases) that 
keep them in a unit; and  
  case-by-case on dockets. 
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Nearly 2/3 (65%) of states do not divide central panels into sub-
units based on ALJ specialization in technical areas, while 30% 
(7/23) of states do. One state divides some of the central panel ALJs 
into sub-units while others are general jurisdiction. 
ALJ assignments are made with expertise in mind in nearly 2/3 
(65%) of states while the other third of states do not assign ALJs 
according to their expertise. 
 
Perspectives from Administrative Law Judges About the Role 
and Independence of ALJs 
 
We conducted a limited survey of administrative law judges 
(ALJs) that included five judges from four states. While these data 
certainly are not conclusive due to the very small sample size—we 
believe they suggest potential trends and areas for further research to 
determine best practices and lessons learned from central panels 
nationwide. Summaries of the key findings are below. 
 
Specialization of ALJs 
 
  Most (4/5) ALJs do not believe that an ALJ should have 
specific expertise in every area of which he/she presides. 
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  All ALJs disagreed or strongly disagreed that ALJs in a 
central panel system experience too much variety in the 
cases coming before them. 
 
Independence of ALJs 
 
  All reporting ALJs disagree or strongly disagree that 
agencies still view ALJs as agency employees. 
  All reporting ALJs believe that employment by the central 
panel better insulates ALJ decisions from inappropriate 
agency influence. 
  Most (3/5) reporting ALJs agree or strongly agree that if 
central panel ALJs’ office quarters are located within an 
agency the ALJs will more likely be subject to 
inappropriate agency influence. The other two ALJs were 
undecided 
  Most (3/5) reporting ALJs believe that a mechanism for 
evaluating the job performance of ALJs will not 
jeopardize their independence. Two ALJs said that it 
depends. 
 
Jurisdiction of ALJs/central panels 
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All the central panels we surveyed provide ALJs for contested 
hearings. A little more than 20% (5/23) determine the validity of 
agency rules. Descriptions of other responsibilities include: 
 
  conduct mediations for state and municipal entities; 
  adjudicate all violations of the Code of ordinances for 12 
citation issuing departments and agencies; 
  adjudicate workers compensation cases; and 
  provide ALJs for contested hearings in matters where they 
have specific statutory authority. In some instances, they 
provide “contract” ALJs for certain other entities where 
contested hearings are required. 
 
The types of cases most frequently heard by central panels 
include licensing, permit, or certificate applications, suspension or 
revocations (22/23) and individual benefit claims, disability 
allowances, and workers comp (19/23). Ratemaking or valuations 
cases (15/23) and rulemaking and regulations cases (13/23) are 
infrequently or never heard by central panels. 
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Final Decision-making Authority 
Central panels in nearly all (22/23) the states we surveyed require 
ALJ decisions to be in writing, and include findings of fact, and 
decisions of law. More than half (13/23) say that ALJ decisions are 
considered recommendations. Other types of requirements noted for 
ALJ decisions include a decision and order, recommendations in 
some cases but not all, citations to the record, and policy statements. 
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The decision-making authority of central panel ALJs varies 
greatly, but the widest agreement (20/23) is on the authority to enter 
final decisions only for certain types of cases. The least common 
decision-making authority is to enter final decisions on issues of both 
fact and law, with agency ability to review and modify sanctions. 
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Additional comments demonstrate the wide variety of decision-
making authority held by central panel ALJs. The most frequent 
comments clarified that initial or recommended decisions can 
become law after a given number of days (from 30 to 90) and that 
some or most decisions are final for particular types of cases, while 
other types of cases are exempted. 
Agency authority to review ALJ decisions differs widely. The 
most common authority belongs to the litigant, who in 70% (16/23) 
of states has the opportunity to see the ALJ’s decision before the 
agency issues a final order. Comments demonstrate that agency 
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ALJ decisions are accepted as written 70–100% of the time in 
20/23 states. ALJ decisions are accepted with modifications less than 
10% of the time in nearly half (11/23) of states. 
 
Addressing Agency Concerns with the Creation or Expansion of 
a Central Panel System 
 
We also conducted a limited survey of central panel directors 
(nine CPDs from nine different states/municipalities). Again, while 
these data certainly are not conclusive—due to the very small sample 
size—we believe they suggest potential trends and areas for further 
research to determine best practices and lessons learned from central 
panels nationwide. Summaries of the key findings are below. For 
additional discussion from the results of interviews about agency 
concerns, please see section on Addressing Agency Concerns with 
the Central Panel System on page 46 of this report. 
 
Initial concerns regarding the adoption of a central panel 
 
By far, the most significant concerns regarding the adoption of a 
central panel revolved around the agencies’ perceived loss of control. 
Additionally, CPDs expressed concerns about agencies’ willingness 
to accept recommended decisions that challenged the agencies’ initial 
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determinations. Another CPD mentioned concerns regarding 
sustainability. 
 
Concerns remaining after initial adoption of central panel 
 
The CPDs who were surveyed on this issue agreed that in the 
long run, the initial concerns regarding the adoption of a central panel 
were abated. One CPD commented that “the rate of acceptance of 
recommended decisions by agency directors, even those that have 
gone counter to the initial agency determination, is substantial. In 
those cases where the recommended decision goes contrary to the 
initial agency, the rate of acceptance of the recommended decision is 
about 90%.” 
Another CPD commented that “the challenge was political, not 
logistical or managerial. Once the political question of prior agency 
autonomy was resolved by legislative mandate, there was little 
challenge in the execution of that mandate.” 
A CPD also noted that “some agencies may not have the win 
percentage the agency would like, but the process is well respected.” 
While “the agencies did lose some control, the benefits of having an 
independent judge far outweigh any issues with control.” Another 
CPD noted that while one agency briefly switched back to having its 
own hearing officers after an attempt at independent ALJs it did 
return back to the independent ALJ system. 
 
Challenges with expansion of central panels 
 
The main challenges noted by CPDs with the expansion of central 
panels have revolved around resources and unpredictable swings in 
workload. One CPD explained that, “since its creation, numerous 
new jurisdictions have been added without new resources.” Other 
CPDs expressed concern about “the agency's growth over time, 
taking in new subject areas and handling areas that are constantly 
evolving and fluctuating” or highly technical matters occasionally 
being difficult when the judge assigned had a limited background in 
that area. Another CPD noted that “the only current problem comes 
during sunset periods when we have to remind legislators of the 
reasoning behind the implementation of a central panel.” 
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Benefits of central panels 
The central panel directors we surveyed on this question cited 
multiple benefits of central panels, but the most common (6/9) was 
improvements in public trust or perceived impartiality of the 
administrative courts. This improvement was illustrated in a 
comment from one CPD: 
 
“Of paramount importance is the trust that has built up 
with the public that citizens will receive a fair and 
impartial hearing forum. There is no doubt that those 
persons who participate in administrative litigation 
through our central panel feel that regardless of the 
outcome, they have been given a fair hearing by an 
agency that is independent. This is reflected in our 
annually accumulated post hearing surveys. Without 
exception, over the last 20 years the number of 
participants rating the process as good to excellent 
have exceeded 90%.” 
 
CPDs’ desired modifications of the central model in their state 
 
Multiple CPDs commented that they would incorporate more 
state agencies into the central panel model if they could. One CPD 
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noted expanding the number of local jurisdictions for which they 
handle administrative hearings would be desirable. Another CPD 
commented that perceived fairness could be improved if they had 
enough judges so a party could exclude a judge by right. This 
respondent also explained that having more full time ALJs would 
help with managing workload, building camaraderie, and providing 
for backup. 
 
Would CPDs revert to the administrative law model that existed prior 
to the central panel model if they could? 
 




New types of cases that have come under the jurisdiction of the 
central panel since its inception 
 
Many CPDs we surveyed noted that the central panels have been 
expanding consistently. One explained, “the history in our state is 
one of aggregation. The Central Panel started out as a natural 
resource hearing panel in 1985 and has never lost a jurisdiction. 
Today, it hears all manner of cases.” 
The most common new types of cases absorbed by central panels 
include workers compensation, tax issues, special education, teacher 
dismissal and other employee disciplinary and appeals processes, 
public benefits (including SNAP eligibility, Medicaid eligibility, 
TANF), medical malpractice, child/adult abuse or neglect, Title IX, 
environmental cases, and child support. Following trends in 
legislation nationwide, a frequently noted new area of jurisdiction 
was marijuana regulation, licensing, and enforcement. 
 
XIV. SUGGESTED PRACTICES OF CENTRAL PANELS AND CENTRAL 
PANEL ALJS 
 
Based on our current research, the following are some practices 
to be considered: 
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  Create an advisory council to give direction, policy 
counsel, and advice on the adoption of rules established 
by the central panel. Such a reform council could include 
a review of current practices and procedures within both 
the judicial court system and the administrative hearing 
system, with a constructive exchange of ideas and 
proposals; 
  Create reasonable completion deadlines for ALJ decisions 
that are both timely and fair, and seek input from ALJs; 
  Implement high application and selection standards for 
ALJs; 
  Standardize all rules and procedures utilized by the central 
panel system from the beginning, rather than adopting 
existing fractured rules and procedures from the agencies; 
  Assign ALJs hired from agencies to caseloads outside their 
former agency in order to minimize any appearance of 
bias or impropriety; 
  Implement a hybrid system of generalist and specialist 
ALJs; 
  Direct funding allocation from the legislature; 
  Utilize technology, including implementing electronic data 
collection systems to track cases and electronic filing 
systems as well as permitting parties to access forms 
online; 
  Implement a complaint process for lawyers and pro se 
litigants to voice concerns. Implement consumer 
satisfaction surveys for lawyers and litigants. Survey 
agency officials for their satisfaction with the central 
panel and for their recommendations; 
  Require implicit bias training for central panel ALJs; 
  Provide training for central panel ALJs that focuses on 
approaches to handling the hearing room when one or 
more of the parties is unrepresented by legal counsel; 
  Focus on increasing diversity among central panel ALJs; 
  Continue research on pros and cons of ALJ decision 
finality; 
  Maintain flexibility in the management of central panels to 
handle fluctuating caseloads; and 
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  Further investigate the benefits of state-specific practices 
including: 
o  To promote safety and visibility, the North Carolina 
central panel conducts a majority of its hearings in 
courthouses located throughout the state. 
o  In Georgia, state legislation has given its central 
panel ALJs the ability to issue fines to litigants 
and lawyers for disobeying subpoenas, not 
following court orders, and other misconduct. 
o  Newly hired central panel ALJs in North Carolina 
are assigned a mentor by the central panel, and 
those ALJs receive intensive training at the 
National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada. 
  Issue an annual report analyzing factors including: 
1.  Changes in jurisdiction and documentation 
of the cost impact of these changes, 
2.  Expertise in jurisdiction and documentation 
of the cost impact of these changes, 
3.  Case processing time, 
4.  Case-flow management data, and 




The central panel concept represents a major change in the way 
administrative adjudication is done. Administrative hearing officers 
are hearing cases that are equally important to those being heard in 
most courtrooms in the state courts. But we have not paid enough 
attention to administrative justice, including the decision-making 
independence of these administrative hearing officers—the hidden 
judiciary. 
The benefits of the central panel approach include: 
 
  Increased efficiency, 
  Cost effectiveness, 
  Enhanced public trust and perceived impartiality among 
lawyers and the broader community, 
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  An opportunity to bring more transparency to our justice 
system as well as to attract higher-quality lawyers who 
want to become ALJs. 
 
These benefits are weighed against the commonly expressed 
administrative agency concern that the central panel approach leads 
to a loss of agency control and a loss of policy expertise at the 
adjudicative level. 
Despite these concerns, while the pace of creation of new central 
panels has slowed in recent years, the jurisdictions of the existing 
central panels have increased. The typical growth pattern of central 
panels is to see an increasing number of agencies having their cases 
heard by central panel ALJs. 
The focus on the central panel system has historically been on 
whether the central panel brings cost efficiency and whether it brings 
an enhanced perception of impartiality. But it also has provided a 
laboratory to test new approaches to adjudication. Central panel 
directors report an increasing number of new types of cases being 
brought into their operation, including issues that have historically 
been handled in other types of tribunals such as the state courts of 
general jurisdiction. These issues include child support, corrections, 
medical leave disputes, and conflicts related to Article IX policies. 
Moreover, as central panels become more trusted by the 
executive and legislative branches of state government for their 
ability to provide high-quality and independent adjudication, they 
become the “go to” tribunal for administrative adjudication, 
mediation, and rulemaking expertise. 
The central panel has also brought new approaches to 
adjudication involving large percentages of unrepresented persons—
an issue that our state court systems struggle with on an ongoing 
basis. 
The central panel movement represents state- and municipality- 
based laboratories developing new approaches to resolving disputes. 
As a research and advocacy organization focused on identifying and 
stopping injustice in the court system, Chicago Appleseed believes 
that the central panel movement has become such an important part 
of our justice system that it deserves the ongoing attention of social 
justice advocates. 
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We must ensure that the administrative adjudication portion of 
our justice system is accountable and transparent—and the central 
panel movement is an important part of this goal. We must make a 
review of this system a part of our watchdog/reform efforts—the 
lives of hundreds of thousands of persons and businesses are at stake. 
 
XVI. APPENDIX: CENTRAL PANEL SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
Central Panel Survey Questions – For Central Panel Directors 
 
1. Which state do you work in? 
2. Is the information on your website up to date? 
3. What is the central panel in your state responsible for? (Bold 
all that apply.) 
a. Provide ALJs for contested hearings 
b. Determine validity of agency rules 
c. Other – Please explain. 
4. How do cases reach the central panel for hearing? (Bold all 
that apply.) 
a. Agency requests hearing 
b. Litigant requests hearing directly from central panel 
c. Other – Please explain. 
5. How frequently are the following types of cases heard? Please 
answer Frequently, Occasionally, or Never for each type of 
case. 
a. Licensing, permit, or certificate applications, 
suspensions, or revocations 
b. Ratemaking or valuations 
c. Rulemaking, regulations 
d. Individual benefit claims, disability allowances, 
worker’s compensation 
e. Enforcement proceedings (civil rights, unfair trade, 
labor relations, safety, etc.) 
f. Other – Please explain. 
6. Are the hearing public or private? 
7. Are the hearings recorded? 
8. How are ALJs recruited? (Bold all that apply.) 
a. General advertisement  
b. Legal publication 
c. State employment bulletin 
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d. Informal means 
e. Other – Please explain. 
9. How are ALJ assignments made? 
a. Case-by-case 
b. One agency for extended period of time 
10. Is the central panel divided into sub-units based on ALJ 
specialization in technical areas? 
11. Are ALJ assignments made with expertise in mind? 
12. Are agencies permitted to refer cases to an entity other than 
the central panel? 
a. No, central panel use is mandatory. 
b. Agency heads have two options: to hear the case 
personally and within the agency, or to refer it to the 
central panel. 
c. Agency heads are allowed to refer cases outside of the 
agency to entities other than the central panel. 
d. Other – Please explain. 
13. Is there a right to counsel? 
14. What is required of an ALJ decision? (Bold all that apply.) 
a. Must be in writing 
b. Findings of fact 
c. Decisions of law 
d. Recommendation 
e. Other – Please Explain.  
15. Please select all of the following statements that accurately 
describe the finality of ALJ decisions. Please explain your 
answers if necessary.  
a. ALJs have authority to enter final decisions of fact.  
b. ALJs have authority to enter final decisions of law.  
c. ALJs have authority to enter final decisions only for 
certain types of cases. 
d. ALJs have authority to enter final decisions on issues of 
both fact and law, but the agency may review to 
modify sanctions. 
e. ALJs have authority to enter an initial decision that will 
become final after a specified number of days if 
neither party appeals the decision to the agency head. 
(If selecting this option, please indicate the number of 
days.)  
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f. ALJs only have authority to enter a proposed decision. 
The agency must review and enter an order based 
thereon before the decision becomes final.  
g. The losing party may appeal to the courts from an 
adverse ALJ decision. 
16. Please select all of the statements below that accurately 
describe agency review of ALJ decisions. Please explain your 
answers if necessary.  
a. On review of the ALJ’s decision, the agency has all the 
authority it would have had in making the initial 
decision including a full substitution of judgment on 
all matters of both fact and law.  
b. On review of the proposed decisions the agency must 
accept all ALJ fact findings that are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record as a whole but may 
substitute the agency’s conclusions for those of the 
ALJ on issues of law and policy. 
c. In substituting agency fact findings for ALJ fact 
findings, the agency must give an adequate 
explanation of why it is rejecting the ALJ’s fact 
findings. 
d. A litigant has an opportunity to see the ALJ’s decisions 
before the agency issues a formal order. 
17. To what extent do agencies accept ALJ decisions?  
a. Percent accepted as written:  
b. Percent accepted with modifications:  
18. What new types of cases have come under the jurisdiction of 
the central panel since its inception? (Ex. traffic court, child 
support, eviction, divorce, probate, etc.)  
19. What qualifications are required of a director?  
20. How are directors appointed/chosen?  
21. What are the duties and responsibilities of the director? (Bold 
all that apply.)  
a. Initially organize the central panel 
b. Develop budget  
c. Develop rules of procedure  
d. Develop performance standards for ALJs  
e. Develop library resources  
f. Involved with hiring of ALJs  
g. Evaluate ALJs  
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h. Review ALJ decisions  
i. Oversee training of new ALJs  
j. Oversee continuing education of ALJs  
k. Assign cases to ALJs 
l. Docket cases  
m. Manage the office  
n. Hire support staff  
o. Consult with administrative agencies  
p. Consult with the legislature  
q. Hear cases 
r. Other – Please explain. 
22. How long is the director's term? 
23. How is the director evaluated? 
24. How is the director removed?  
25. Does the central panel regularly receive feedback from 
private litigants or the agencies under the central panel's 
jurisdiction? (an example of this would be satisfaction 
surveys administered after the completion of a case.)  
26. Thank you for completing our survey. As we mentioned in 
the accompanying letter, we would also like to contact 
practitioners and agency personnel to learn about the impact 
of the central panel on their work. If you have suggestions for 
people we should contact, or existing research (such as survey 
data or other feedback) we should consider, please indicate 
this below. If you have already provided this information to 
us by email, please feel free to disregard this.  
 
Central Panel Survey Questions – For Administrative Law 
Judges (ALJs) 
 
1. How many years have you been an ALJ with your central 
panel office? 
2. What was your occupation prior to serving as an ALJ in the 
central panel? 
3. How did you learn of your current position? 
4. What is the selection process for ALJs? 
5. Does your position as ALJ represent a financial improvement 
or a financial sacrifice when compared to your previous 
position? (Bold applicable response.)  
a. Improvement 
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b. Sacrifice 
6. Did you receive your highest academic degree in the state you 
are currently employed in? (Bold applicable response.) 
a. Yes 
b. No 
7. What is the term of office for ALJs? 
8. What is the removal process for ALJs? (Bold all that apply.) 
a. For cause 
b. Probationary period 
c. Discretionary 
d. Other: 
9. How are ALJs evaluated? (Bold all that apply.) 
a. Annual Review 
b. Informal 
c. Other: 
10. How are salary and promotions determined? 
11. In your opinion, will an ALJ evaluation mechanism 





12. In your opinion, should an ALJ have specific expertise in the 
areas over which he/she presides? (Bold applicable response.) 
a. Yes 
b. No 
13. Rate the following resources as: Adequate, Inadequate, Do 
not have but desirable, or Do not have and unnecessary 
a. Law library 
b. Personal law clerk 
c. Shared law clerk 
d. Personal secretarial assistance 
e. Subscriptions to legal periodicals or commercial 
services 
f. Regular policy briefings by agency officials 
g. Hearing manual for ALJs 
h. Technical assistance by designated staff member 
i. Index of prior ALJ decisions  
j. Uniform rules of practice for all hearings 
k. State of the art office equipment 
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l. Financial support for attending continuing education 
seminars, meetings 
14. Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following 
statements: Strongly Agree, Agree, Undecided, Disagree, or 
Strongly Disagree 
a. An ALJ should be free to deviate from the central panel 
rules of hearing procedure if the situation necessitates. 
b. ALJs are adequately compensated for their work. 
c. An ALJ’s skills are utilized more effectively in a 
central panel system. 
d. ALJs in a central panel system experience too much 
variety in the cases coming before them. 
e. ALJs are under undue pressure to decide cases quickly. 
f. Agency officials still view ALJs as agency employees. 
g. If an ALJ is employed by a central panel his/her 
decisions will be better insulated from inappropriate 
agency influence. 
h. A central panel ALJ whose office quarters are located 
within an agency will more likely be subject to 
inappropriate agency influence. 
i. An ALJ should be free to deviate from the central panel 
rules of hearing procedure if the situation necessitates. 
j. ALJs are adequately compensated for their work. 
k. An ALJ’s skills are utilized more effectively in a 
central panel system. 
l. ALJs in a central panel system experience too much 
variety in the cases coming before them. 
m. ALJs are under undue pressure to decide cases quickly. 
n. Agency officials still view ALJs as agency employees. 
o. If an ALJ is employed by a central panel his/her 
decisions will be better insulated from inappropriate 
agency influence. 
p. A central panel ALJ whose office quarters are located 
within an agency will more likely be subject to 
inappropriate agency influence. 
15. How much of the total time spent doing your job is devoted to 
the following activities? 0-10%, 10-20%, 20-30%, 30-40%, 
40-50%, 50-60%, 60-70%, 70- 80%, 80-90%, or 90-100% 
a. Pretrial preparation (readings researching, etc.) 
b. Conducting pre-hearing conferences and negotiations 
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c. Presiding at formal hearings 
d. Written decisions 
e. Travel 
f. Administrative duties 
g. Other hearing-related activities 
h. Pretrial preparation (reading, researching, etc.) 
i. Conducting pre-hearing conferences and negotiations 
j. Presiding at formal hearings 
k. Written decisions 
l. Travel 
m. Administrative duties 
n. Other hearing-related activities 
16. How frequently do you engage in the following work-related 
activities? Frequently, Occasionally, or Infrequently/Never 
a. Read decisions of other ALJs 
b. Read final agency decisions or opinions 
c. Read industry publications or commercial services 
d. Consult other ALJs for advice or information prior to 
hearing 
e. Consult other ALJs while case is pending 
f. Request drafts of decisions from your law clerk 
g. Talk with individual members of the private bar about 
agency procedures 
h. Make suggestions to agency officials about policy 
changes 
i. Disqualify yourself from hearing a case 
j. Attend professional meetings or seminars 
k. Wear a robe during a hearing 
17. Which of the following general categories of proceedings do 






18. Rate the frequency with which you do the following 
activities: Frequently, In some cases, or Never 
a. Conduct pre-hearing conferences 
b. Direct counsel to brief certain legal issues 
c. Go off the record to deal with procedural problems 
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d. Question witnesses directly 
e. Call in witnesses on your own initiative 
f. Admit evidence for whatever it may be worth 
g. Deliver decisions orally 
h. Rule on requests for discovery 
i. Employ sanctions for improper conduct in hearing room 
